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It remains difficult to understand how government could respond so
ineffectively to a disaster that was predicted for years, and for
which specific dire warnings had been issued for days. If this is
what happens when we have advance warning, I shudder to imagine
the consequences when we do not.
[T]he fact remains that Katrina's strength and the potential disaster
it could bring were made clear well in advance through briefings
and formal advisories. It remains clear that, in response, there was
profound government hesitancy at all levels.'
I. INTRODUCTION: A MOST UNWELCOME GUEST
On August 25, 2005, students at Tulane University left their new college
campus amidst the freshman orientation program at the request of the
university's administration. 2 In the automated fashion that children evacuate
a schoolhouse during a fire drill, students either returned to their hometowns
to spend some unexpected time with friends and family, or traveled to other
regional college campuses in hopes of finding a back-to-school celebration.
3
They were told that a storm was coming, but not to be alarmed - it was a
routine occurrence for students to be temporarily evacuated from Tulane's
campus in the wake of an approaching hurricane.4 As experience had
suggested, the students were told that the evacuation was merely one of a
precautionary nature, and that just as all of the hurricanes in the past decade
had done, this one would either completely miss New Orleans5 or become
1. Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina and When, Hearing Before Select
Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th
Cong. (Sept. 22, 2005) (opening statement of Tom Davis, Chairman, Select Bipartisan Comm. to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina), available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09 22 05/davisopenstate092205.doc. In response to the flood
of public criticism regarding the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, the United States
created the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina (Select Committee). See H.R. Res. 437, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hr437.pdf.
2. See Katrina Stories, http://www2.tulane.edukatrina-messages/view.cfm (last visited Feb. 1,
2007).
3. Id.
4. Tulane University evacuated its campus in 1998 during Hurricane George, and
again in 2004 during Hurricane Ivan. See Tulane University, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulane University#TulaneMyth-andLore (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
5. Three days before Hurricane Katrina arrived at the Louisiana-Mississippi border, the
National Hurricane Center predicted landfall in the eastern Florida panhandle, several hundred miles
east of New Orleans. Michael Chemekoff & Amy Cowley, Will Hurricane Katrina Further Define
the "Act of God "Defense?, 30 ST. B. TEX. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY RESOURCES 38 (2005).
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mere wind and rainfall by the time it hit. 6  As Tulane students typically
equate these "precautionary evacuations" to a second spring break, the
student body understandingly welcomed the evacuation as an opportunity to
squeeze in one last party weekend before classes began. While the weekend
was sure to have been filled with much fun and drink, Monday proved to be
quite the sobering experience.
On the morning of Monday, August 29, 2005, the evacuated students,
along with the rest of America, gaped at their television sets in horror as
Hurricane Katrina crossed Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne to make
landfall near the Louisiana-Mississippi border.7 Arriving as a Category 4
hurricane with sustainable winds of over 140 miles per hour, Katrina easily
6. Hurricanes George and Ivan missed New Orleans and resulted in mere rainfall and heavy
winds. See Tulane University, supra note 4.
7. Id.; see also Raymond Seed et al., Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New
Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, Report No. UCB/CITRIS - 05/01,
at 1-8, Nov. 2, 2005, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/l I /leveerepor.prelim.pdf.
Hurricane Katrina made landfall at 6:10 a.m. on Monday, August 29, 2005, in the lower edge of
Plaquemines Parish just outside of the town of Buras, Louisiana. See Chemekoff & Cowley, supra
note 5, at 38. Often characterized as the worst natural disaster in our country's history, Hurricane
Katrina devastated major parts of the central Gulf Coast of the United States. See Hurricane Katrina,
Wikipedia Encylopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HurricaneKatrina (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
While Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 storm, the National Hurricane Center categorized her as
a Category 5 only hours earlier. Id. At that time, Katrina was the third strongest Atlantic storm in
recorded history, with sustained winds reaching 175 miles per hour. Id. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration recorded Katrina's storm surges to be in excess of twenty-five feet. Id.
Katrina's surge caused several breaches in the protective levees around New Orleans. Id. Most of
the city was subsequently flooded, as breached drainage and commercial shipping canals allowed
water to flow from the Gulf of Mexico and surrounding lakes into low elevated areas. Id. Katrina
also devastated the Mississippi and Alabama coasts, making it "the most destructive and costliest
natural disaster in the history of the United States." Id. Katrina's confirmed death toll stands at
1,836. Id. 1,577 of these deaths were in Louisiana. Id. Around one-half of Louisiana's fatalities
were in Orleans Parish. Id. Within days of Katrina's landfall, public criticism arose regarding local,
state and federal government preparation and response. Id. Criticism was prompted largely by
televised images of dying residents who remained in New Orleans without food, water, or shelter.
Id. Additionally, many citizens who remained housed in evacuation facilities, such as the
Superdome, died from thirst, exhaustion and violence after the storm itself had passed. Id. This also
fueled much public criticism. Id. Critics alleged that race, class, and other factors could have
contributed to the hesitation of the government's response. Id. As floodwaters did not completely
recede for several weeks, the majority of homes and structures in Orleans Parish and surrounding
parishes were destroyed or washed away. See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223-24
(E.D. La. 2005), modified, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D. La. 2006), and dismissed in part, 436 F. Supp.
2d 802 (E.D. La. 2006). Approximately ninety percent of the buildings lining Mississippi's Gulf
Coast were also wiped away by storm surges that reached up to thirty feet. Id. at 224. Katrina
eventually passed into Alabama, submerging large sections of Mobile. Id. As a result of the high
floodwaters, many people, especially in the city of New Orleans, literally had to evacuate their
homes and swim to safety. Id.
overwhelmed New Orleans' system of protective levees,8 and floodwaters
quickly engulfed more than eighty percent of the city to depths in excess of
twenty-five feet. 9 As Katrina's tidal surge destroyed nearly everything in its
250 mile wake, coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
suffered catastrophic damage.' °  While property damage caused by
floodwaters reached an unprecedented level," the biggest tragedy left
behind by Katrina was the loss of life. ' 2 When Mayor C. Ray Nagin issued
a mandatory city-wide evacuation less than a day before landfall, the most
impoverished twenty percent of New Orleans' population did not share the
same luxury the Tulane students enjoyed, namely the means and ability to
evacuate New Orleans.' 3 Over 70,000 residents were left behind to greet
Katrina head-on as she arrived at their doorsteps. 14  Drowning in the
floodwaters and starving to death while awaiting rescue, over 1,800
Americans lost their lives during Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.' 5
As the deadliest natural disaster in recent American history,' 6 Hurricane
Katrina shined a spotlight on the government's 7 inability to protect its
citizens from Mother Nature's wrath, as well as its inability to coordinate
between various administrative branches and agencies to effectively
implement disaster preparation and relief measures.18 More than one year
after Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, something still stinks in the Big
Easy. The stench of grave injustice lingers on above the piles of mold and
rotting debris that comprise what was once the Ninth Ward neighborhood.' 9
8. See infra Part II.A.I (discussing the levees).
9. See Chernekoff& Cowley, supra note 5, at 38.
10. See supra note 7 (discussing damage caused by Hurricane Katrina).
11. See supra note 7. The total property damage from Katrina is estimated at $81.2 billion,
nearly double the cost of the second most expensive storm, Hurricane Andrew. See Hurricane
Katrina, supra note 7.
12. See supra note 7 (discussing Hurricane Katrina's death toll).
13. See McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (E.D. La. 2005), modified, 408 F. Supp.
2d 221 (E.D. La. 2006), and dismissed in part, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. La. 2006). More than
90,000 people in the affected areas had an annual household income of less than $10,000. Id. Sixty-
five percent of poor elderly households in New Orleans did not own a vehicle. Id. Thirty-five
percent of black households and fifty-nine percent of poor black households living in New Orleans
did not own a vehicle. Id. at 224-25.
14. See id.
15. Katrina's death toll broken down by state is as follows: Louisiana: 1,577, Mississippi: 238,
Alabama: 2, Florida: 14, Georgia: 2, Kentucky: 1, Ohio: 2, additional missing: 705. See Hurricane
Katrina, supra note 7.
16. Table I lists the deadliest disasters in American History. See Appendix, infra at Table 1; List
of United States Disasters by Death Toll, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/ListofUnitedStatesdisastersbydeath toll (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
17. The term "government," when used in this freestanding way, simultaneously refers to all
American federal, state, and local governmental bodies and agencies.
18. See discussion infra Part II (discussing preparation and response efforts).
19. Arguably the worst hit area of New Orleans, the Lower Ninth Ward was an extremely poor
and predominately black neighborhood. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Once More, a Neighborhood
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The people of New Orleans 20 were left with no answers as to why their
government failed to protect them from this long anticipated disaster, and
most importantly, no clearly established legal recourse against a government
that seemed to "look the other way" in the face of their suffering.2' Forms
of sovereign immunity 22 complicate and obstruct the path that citizens must
take in order to bring valid claims against the government for Katrina-related
negligence. An examination of the facts and existing legal framework is
needed to answer the question: Do the people of New Orleans have any legal
recourse against the government?
It is not the purpose of this Comment to criticize the domestic political
agendas of governmental bodies in the United States. A discussion of
specific political reforms within the government's ranks that must transpire
before a tragedy like Katrina occurs again is beyond the scope of this
discussion. This Comment simply acknowledges that the people of New
Orleans were harmed by governmental actions in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, and analyzes the potential for negligence claims to be brought
against the responsible parties.
Sees the Worst, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A18. Thirty-six percent of all Lower Ninth Ward
residents lived below the poverty line-nearly twice Louisiana's poverty rate. Id. Before Hurricane
Katrina hit, the Lower Ninth Ward was home to 20,000 residents. Gabrielle Chwallek, A Year After
Katrina: No Return to Normalcy for New Orleans, MONSTERS AND CRITICS, Aug. 29, 2006,
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/northamerica/article-I 195795.php/Ayearafter_Katrina_No_re
turn - to -normalcy-for_.NewOrleans. Famous past residents include jazz legends Louis Armstrong,
Mahalia Jackson, Fats Domino, and the Marsalis brothers. Id. Only around 1,000 people have
returned to the Ninth Ward since Katrina, and most of them are residing in mobile trailer homes. Id.
20. Whenever referring to the destruction that occurred and the residents who were harmed in
New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the devastated areas and residents of Mississippi and
Alabama are being simultaneously referred to as well. Additionally, "New Orleans" also includes
the surrounding areas of southeastern Louisiana that were similarly affected.
21. As one New Orleanian has put it:
We were abandoned. City officials did nothing to protect us. We're told to go to the
Superdome, the Convention Center, the interstate bridge for safety. We did this more
than once. In fact, we tried them all every day for over a week. We saw buses,
helicopters, and FEMA trucks, but no one stopped to help us. We never felt so cut off in
our lives. When you feel like this, you do one of two things. You either give up or go
into survival mode. We chose the latter. This is how we made it. We slept next to dead
bodies, we slept on streets at least four times next to human feces and urine. There was
garbage everywhere in the city. Panic and fear had taken over.
Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm, Hearing Before Select Bipartisan Comm.
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2005)
(statement of Patricia Thompson, New Orleans Resident and Evacuee), available at
http://www.semp.us/publications/biot-reader.php?BiotlD=306.
22. See infra Part 1lI.B (discussing sovereign immunity).
Part II analyzes the government's preparation and response efforts
connected to Hurricane Katrina, and determines whether various roles and
responsibilities were adequately fulfilled.23 Part III discusses the areas of
the law relevant to bringing negligence claims against the government and
how they have evolved to their current state.24 Part IV presents the hurdles
which claimants will face in suits against the government, and discusses how
courts can interpret ambiguous law to produce just results.2 5 Part V
discusses the future implications of Katrina litigation, and offers
justifications for spreading costs among American taxpayers.26 Part VI
concludes by asserting the need for Katrina victims to be allowed their day
21in court.
II. "WHAT HAPPENED" AND "WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED":
GOVERNMENTAL PREPARATION AND RESPONSE EFFORTS
"The contaminated water that filled the New Orleans 'saucer' was
seasoned with government bureaucracy; a recipe for a foul gumbo.
28
An analysis of the relevant governmental actions undertaken in
anticipation of and in response to Hurricane Katrina will help shed light on
questions concerning potential governmental liability. The following factual
synopsis will assist in determining why governmental preparation and
response efforts, if undertaken at all, failed at the federal, state, and local
levels. When reviewing the relevant factual information, it is important to
simultaneously analyze "what happened" and "what should have happened."
A. Governmental Preparation Efforts
Devastating damage expected . . . Hurricane Katrina ...a most
powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength . ..rivaling the
intensity of Hurricane Camille of 1969. . . . Most of the area will be
uninhabitable for weeks . . .perhaps longer. At least one-half of
well constructed homes will have roof and wall failure. All gabled
roofs will fail . . . leaving those homes severely damaged or
destroyed . . . . Water shortages will make human suffering
incredible by modern standards. 29
23. See infra notes 28-141 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 142-209 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 210-392 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 393-402 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
28. Faith J. Jackson, A Streetcar Named Negligence in a City Called New Orleans-A Duty
Owed, A Duty Breached, A Sovereign Shield, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 557, 563 (2006).
29. Public Advisory, National Weather Center (New Orleans, LA), Urgent Weather Message:
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1. The Levees
"What happened to us this year... can only be described as a catastrophe of
Biblical proportions .... We would not be here today if the levees had not
failed.,
30
Positioned in the delta at the mouth of the Mississippi River, the
majority of the city of New Orleans lies below sea level.31 Because of its
unique topographical setting, New Orleans has long been and will always be
vulnerable to hurricanes and flooding.32 With flood risks from Lake
Pontchartrain to the north, the Mississippi River to the south, and Lake
Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico to the east, the city has long maintained a
protective flood control system.33 Floodwalls constructed by the United
Devastating Damage Expected (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:11 a.m. CDT), http://www.weather.gov/
os/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
30. Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Hearing Before
Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of Kathleen Blanco, Governor of Louisiana), available at
http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_14_05/babineaux_ 121405.doc.
31. Douglas A. Kysar & Thomas 0. McGarity, Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees, the
Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight, 56 DUKE L.J. 179, 182, 185 (2006); see also New
Orleans, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NewOrleans,-Louisiana (last visited
Jan. 11, 2006). Much of New Orleans lies one to ten feet below sea level. Id.
32. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 182-83. In 1957, Hurricane Audrey struck
Louisiana and Texas, killing 526 people and causing damage totaling $120 million in Louisiana
alone. David Roth, Louisiana Hurricane History: Late 20th Century, http://www.srh.
weather.gov/lch/research/lalate20hur.php (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). In 1965, Hurricane Betsy
devastated New Orleans, inundating over 5,000 square miles in Louisiana. See A FAILURE OF
INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 87-88 (2006), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf (hereinafter FINAL REPORT). Betsy left 81
dead, injured more than 17,600, and caused 250,000 residents to evacuate to storm shelters. Id.
In 1969, Hurricane Camille struck several states along the Gulf Coast killing 256 people
and causing over $1.4 billion in damage. National Hurricane Center, Hurricane History,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shmtl (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). In 1992,
Hurricane Andrew caused twenty-three deaths in the United States and $1 billion in damage in
Southern Louisiana. Id. In late 2005, less than a month after Katrina, Hurricane Rita brought storm
surges which inundated portions of New Orleans previously flooded by Katrina and caused an
additional $10 billion in damage. Id.
33. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 182. While a large area of open swampland separates
Lake Borgne from populated areas of New Orleans, Lake Pontchartrain runs up against the
downtown and western parts of the city. Id. at 184. These two lakes pose a particularly high flood
risk during the late summer and fall hurricane season. Id. Storm surges in Lake Borgne pose the
greatest risk to New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish, and surges in Lake Pontchartrain primarily
threaten the downtown area. Id. An interconnected system of levees guard the city from surges
from these two lakes. Id. These levees are smaller than the levees that line the Mississippi River,
ranging from 13.5 to 18 feet above sea level in height. Id. These levees are the ones that failed in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and this subsection focuses exclusively on them. Id.
States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), known as "levees," 34 surround the
city in order to protect it from floodwaters. 3"
The current levee system arose from a new plan that was created after
Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in 1965.36 In response to Betsy's
devastation, Congress authorized a large-scale hurricane improvement
initiative known as the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project (LPVHPP).3 7 The LPVHPP was designed to protect the greater New
Orleans area from future hurricanes like Betsy.38 Although the project was
federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort with shared
costs.3 9 The levee systems effectively divide the city up into segments
known as "polders.,, 40  The theory behind this design was that if the levee
system in one polder failed, 41 floodwaters would not spill into the other
polders.4 2
Because much of New Orleans' land mass is below sea level and
continuously sinking,43 rainwater that collects in the city's "bowl-like" base
cannot be removed via natural drainage. 4  To alleviate the drainage
problem, the Corps constructed a system of massive pumps which force
water out of the city into Lake Pontchartrain through three drainage canals.
45
These canals are lined with levees that prevent water from spilling into the
city. 46 In addition to the drainage canals, the Corps also constructed three
large shipping canals in order to permit oceangoing vessels to freely cross
through the city from the Mississippi River. 47  These canals are also
confined by protective levees. 8
34. See NOLA.com, Last Line of Defense: Hoping the Levees Hold,
http://www.nola.com/hurricane/popup/nolalevees-jpg.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) (describing
the levee system in more detail).
35. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 183.
36. Id.; see also supra note 32 (discussing Hurricane Betsy's devastation of southeastern
Louisiana).
37. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 186.
38. See id.
39. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 87.
40. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 3 1, at 185.
41. See Seed et al., supra note 7, at 1-10 (describing the polder system in more detail).
42. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 3 1, at. 185.
43. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 87. Over the years, the city of New Orleans has
continued to sink due to drainage, subsidence, and compaction of soil. Id.
44. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 3 1, at 185.
45. Id, Named after the streets they parallel, the three drainage canals are known as the
Seventeenth Street, London Avenue, and Orleans Avenue Canals. Id.
46. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 185.
47. Id.
The Intercoastal Waterway... connects ports along the entire Gulf Coast .... The Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal (often referred to by the local population as the "Industrial
Canal") slices north-south across the city between the [Mississippi] River and Lake
Pontchartrain . . . The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal bisects the
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Once the construction was completed, responsibility for the operation,
maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of the levees was turned over to a
number of local administrative bodies. 49  These entities included levee
boards for each parish, along with independent sewer and water boards who
were responsible for the maintenance of pumping stations.5 ° Disagreement
among the large number of organizations involved reduced accountability,
created weakness in "transition segments" of the levees, and hindered
maintenance and repair efforts. 1
Industrial Canal ... and travels east-west to ... St. Bernard Parish where it forms a "Y"
with the Intercoastal Waterway [eventually running to the Gulf of Mexico].
Id.
48. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 87.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. In one instance, improvements to levee strength, which may have prevented or mitigated
some of the critical breaches that flooded the downtown area, were rejected by competing local
organizations. Id. Raymond Seed, a scientist who conducted an investigation of the causes of levee
failure, spoke of an instance where Corps officials suggested certain improvements to levee boards,
but was unsuccessful in eliciting any sort of response. Id. at 92. According to Seed:
"No one is in charge. You have got multiple agencies, multiple organizations, some
of whom aren't on speaking terms with each other, sharing responsibilities for
public safety. The Corps of Engineers had asked to put flood gates into the three
canals, which nominally might have mitigated and prevented the three main
breaches that did so much destruction downtown. But they weren't able to do that
because, unique to New Orleans, the Reclamation Districts who are responsible for
maintaining the levees are separate from the Water and Sewage District, which does
the pumping. Ordinarily, the Reclamation District does the dewatering pumping,
which is separate from the water system. These guys don't get along."
Id. (quoting Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail? Before U.S. S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) (statement of R.B.
Seed)). There also appear to have been lapses in the maintenance and inspection of the levees, as
residents who lived along the Seventeenth Street Canal often reported that water was seeping from
the canal into their yards. Id. Reported several months before Katrina hit, these leaks turned out to
be within several hundred feet of where the levee eventually collapsed. Id. A story on National
Public Radio reported:
"State and federal investigators say that a leak may have been an early warning sign that
the soil beneath the levee was unstable and help explain why it collapsed. They also say
if authorities had investigated and found that a leak was undermining the levee, they
could have shored it up and prevented the catastrophic breach."
Id. at 92-93 (quoting Frank Langfitt, Residents Say Levee Leaked Months Before
Katrina, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, MORNING EDITION (Nov. 22, 2005), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5022074). Additionally, post-Katrina
investigators cited instances where wild brush and even trees were allowed to grow along the levees
bordering the Seventeenth Street and London Avenue canals. Id. at 92. This is a particularly
dangerous condition as the growth of vegetation along levees can lead to significant soil erosion.
See id. at 97. The fact that so many different local organizations were involved created a diffusion
of responsibility that resulted in structural weaknesses. See id. at 91. Levee breaches were
287
It is clear that the New Orleans levee system was not designed to endure
the most severe hurricanes.5 2 A published Corps document admits this fact
by noting 'the hurricane protection system is not designed for the largest
storms and as a result, the metropolitan area is vulnerable to flooding from
hurricane storm surges."' 53 When questions were raised about the ability of
the Lake Pontchartrain levees to withstand the most severe storms, the Corps
discussed the possibility of modifying the existing levees in order to increase
their strength, but no actions were ultimately taken. 4 The true explanation
of exactly why the levees in New Orleans failed during Hurricane Katrina
involves a complex analysis of interacting engineering and policy
considerations.55 Through a series of investigations conducted shortly after
the hurricane hit, experts came to a number of preliminary conclusions.56
Katrina's surge caused three major breaches in the Seventeenth Street
and London Avenue levees.5 7 A team of investigators from the University
repeatedly observed at transition sections where two different levee boards were responsible for
different pieces resulting in two different wall systems being joined together. Id. at 91-92.
According to a Corps report, "'[alt sections where infrastructure elements were designed and
maintained by multiple authorities, and their multiple protection elements came together, the
weakest (or lowest) segment or element controlled the overall performance."' Id. at 92 (quoting
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Interim Report to Task Force Guardian, Summary
of Field Observations Relevant to Flood Protection in New Orleans, at 7 (Dec. 5, 2005)). Peter
Nicholson, the head of the Corps team in charge of investigating post-Katrina levee failure,
commented on the weakness of levee transition sections:
"Well, certainly we find that each individual organization will do as they see fit, and
when the two sections of the flood control system operated or owned, designed,
maintained by each of those different organizations come together, they may be in two
different manners. They may have two different heights. They may be two different
materials."
Id. (quoting Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail? Before U.S. S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) (statement of Peter
Nicholson, Associate Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Hawaii)).
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id. (quoting U.S. Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Un-watering Plan Greater
Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, LA, at I (Aug. 18, 2000)). The Corps designed the levees to
withstand a hurricane intensity that might occur once every 200-300 years. Id. The Corps based the
design for the levee system on a hurricane simulation exercise known as the "standard project
hurricane" (SPH). Id. The SPH was roughly equivalent to a fast moving or moderate Category 3
hurricane. Id.
54. Id. at 90. When inquiries were made as to whether the levee system could withstand
hurricanes more powerful than the SPH, such as a Category 4 or 5 storm, the Corps discussed
undertaking a study of needed modifications, but no formal study was ever undertaken. Id.
55. Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 191.
56. See id. In addition to these findings, it was also noted that Jefferson Parish officials ordered
the evacuation of pump station operators prior to the storm. John P. Manard et al., Katrina 's Tort
Litigation: An Imperfect Storm, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 31, 33-34 (2006). The fact that these
pumps were left unmanned has been cited as the cause for much of the flooding in Jefferson Parish.
Id.
57. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 191-92. These breaches allowed floodwaters from
Lake Pontchartrain to engulf wide areas of the downtown polder. Id.
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of California at Berkeley (Berkeley group)58 concluded that the breaches in
the Seventeenth Street and London Avenue Canals were largely due to the
erosion of the soil to which the levees were attached. 9  Their report
explained that pressure generated from the storm surge caused the weak soil
to give way, allowing floodwalls to be pushed back into the protected
areas. 60  Additionally, investigations discovered that at the time the levees
were constructed, the floodwalls were not sufficiently anchored deep enough
into the foundation soils. 6' The Berkeley group concluded that lax
maintenance practices further contributed to the breaches, as trees and brush
were allowed to grow along the base of many of the levees.62 Their report
indicated that the downtown polder would not have flooded had the
Seventeenth Street and London Avenue levees withstood the lateral pressure
of the storm surge inside the canals as they were designed to do.63
Katrina's largest surge did not come from Lake Pontchartrain to the
north, but surprisingly came from Lake Borgne to the east. 64 The levees
built on Lake Borgne to protect New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish
were simply not built high enough to repel Katrina, as they were
58. The Berkeley Group consisted of collaborating teams of scientists and engineers from the
University of California at Berkeley, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the Corps, and the
Louisiana State University Hurricane Research Center. Seed et al., supra note 7, at 1-1. The team's
initial field investigations occurred over a span of approximately two and a half weeks, from
September 28 through October 15, 2005. Id. The principle focus of the investigation was to study
the performance of regional flood protection systems during Hurricane Katrina, and determine
exactly what caused these structures to fail. See id. The project was funded by a grant from the
National Science Foundation. Id. at i.
59. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 192. The Berkeley group concluded that that the
breach on the east side of the Seventeenth Street Canal "appears to have been a stability failure of
the foundation soils beneath the earthen embankment" to which the levee was grounded. Id. The
group's report further stated that the breach on the western side of the London Avenue Canal
"occurred as a result of the sheetpile/floodwall being pushed backwards by the elevated water
pressures on the outboard side, and that support on the inboard side of the sheetpile/floodwall was
reduced as a result of soil failure at or beneath the base of the earthen levee embankment." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Floodwalls built in the 1980s were not sufficiently anchored because the soils
immediately below the existing levees contained spoil from prior instances of digging and dredging.
Id. at 193. Floodwall piling extended only ten feet below sea level in many areas, instead of the
seventeen foot depth requirement called for in the Corps' original design plan. Id. at 194. The
Berkeley group concluded that the Corps' safety margins employed in the design for the levees were
far lower than the safety margins employed in most other critical engineering projects. Id. at 193.
62. Id. at 194-95. This weakened the levees by creating "a maze of small cavities that become
channels for water to migrate from the canals." Id. at 195. State and local officials admitted to
skipping over many canal floodwalls during annual levee inspections, and only giving cursory




immediately overtopped and overwhelmed by the storm surge.65 The failure
of these levees resulted in the flooding of the eastern polder, which was
mainly inhabited by impoverished residents and businesses that catered to
66 lee slocal communities. A levee system more massive in scope could have
protected New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish from the storm surge
from Lake Borgne, but no such structures were contemplated as part of the
Corps' original plan.67
Katrina's storm surge from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Borgne also hit
New Orleans by rushing up the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO)
Canal into the Industrial Canal, and subsequently arriving in the heart of the
City.68 The storm's surge easily overwhelmed the levees running along
these canals, causing a number of breaches in several different locations.69
A post-Katrina modeling demonstration conducted by the Louisiana State
University Hurricane Center (Hurricane Center) concluded that the MRGO
Canal created a "funneling effect" which intensified the storm surge by
about twenty percent.70 G. Paul Kemp, an oceanographer at the Hurricane
Center, stated that he had little doubt that the MRGO Canal "'was the initial
cause of the disaster,"' as it acted as "'a back door into New Orleans."' 7'
From its creation, the MRGO Canal existed as a "shotgun pointed straight at
New Orleans. 7 2  These levee failures resulted in the flooding of large
portions of the polders containing New Orleans East, the Ninth Ward, and
St. Bernard Parish. 73
65. Id. Colonel Richard Wagenaar, the Corps' head engineer in charge of the New Orleans
district, reported that the eastern levees were "literally leveled in places." Id. Storm surges
exceeded the height of some of these levees by as much as five to ten feet. Id.
66. Id. at 195-96.
67. Id. at 196.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 196-97. The MRGO Canal, which narrows from 2000 feet wide where it intersects
with the Intercoastal Waterway to 200 feet where it bisects the Industrial Canal, literally acted as a
funnel, as it increased the velocity of Katrina's surge from three to 6-8 feet per second. Id.
Louisiana State University scientist Hassan Madhriqui stated that the funneling effect that increased
the height of the storm surge "'caused floodwaters to stack up several feet higher than elsewhere in
the metro area and sharply increased the surge's speed as it rushed through the MR-GO and into the
Industrial Canal."' FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 97 (citation omitted). In designing the MRGO
Canal, the Corps should have realized that its funnel-like shape would act to intensify storm surges.
Had the Corps selected a safer design, Katrina's power would not have been intensified, and
significantly less damage would have occurred. See id.
71. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 197 (quoting Jody Warrick & Michael Grunwald,
Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1).
72. John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving Danger: Experts Know We Face a Greater
Threat from Hurricanes than Previously Suspected. But Because the Land is Sinking and the
Coastline is Disappearing, Scientists Can 't Say Just How Vulnerable We Are, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
June 23, 2002, at J12.
73. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 31, at 197. The Industrial Canal's levees experienced a
number of small breaches along both the banks of the canal. Id. These breaches allowed additional
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In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many levees failed in different places
for different reasons. Some levees were overtopped by storm surges and
subsequently scoured away by floodwaters from inside the protected areas.74
Others could not withstand the pressure from the storm surges, and collapsed
because they were not sufficiently embedded within the underlying soils.
75
Additional levees may have failed during the storm because the floodwalls
came apart at "transition segments. 76 Whatever the case may be, it is clear
that the levees were not adequately designed, built, or maintained to protect
New Orleans from a storm such as Katrina, and countless lives were lost as a
result.77 While it may initially seem that the cause of the failures was
nature's wrath, it is clear that man's folly helped Mother Nature out along
the way.78
2. Evacuation
Evacuation efforts are a critical component of emergency preparation
for natural disasters such as hurricanes.7 9 Such preparation entails both
detailed evacuation planning and the adequate implementation of evacuation
plans already in place when it becomes clear that a hurricane will make
landfall in a populated area.8° Much of the suffering in New Orleans and
other affected areas that occurred in the wake of Hurricane Katrina can
largely be attributed to failures in the evacuation efforts.8'
water to flow into the New Orleans East polder. Id. The Berkeley group concluded that "'storm
surges overtopped numerous stretches of levees along this Canal frontage,"' and the Hurricane
Center noted that the increased velocity of the surge as it traveled up the MRGO Canal also
contributed to these failures. Id. (quoting R.B. SEED ET AL., CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. RESEARCH IN THE
INTEREST OF SOC'Y, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEE
SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUG. 29, 2005, at 2-9 (2005), http://www.ce.berkeley.
edu/-neworleans/report/PRE LIM.pdf).
74. Id. at 198.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 115. One analysis stated that "'[t]he bodies of at least
588 people were recovered in neighborhoods that engineers say would have remained largely dry
land had the [levees] not given way."' Id. (quoting John Simerman, Breaches Took Toll: N.O. Ruin
Greatly Increased, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge) Dec. 3 I, 2005, at IA).
78. See discussion infra Part lll.C (discussing the "act of God" defense).
79. FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 103.
80. See id.
81. See id.
Evacuation orders in the days preceding Katrina were given far too late,
or in some cases, not at all. 82  The City of New Orleans Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan (New Orleans Plan) allocates the authority to
order a mandatory evacuation of residents to both the Governor of Louisiana
and the Mayor of New Orleans. 83 Despite sufficient warnings given fifty-six
hours before Katrina's arrival, neither Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco
nor New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation until
nineteen hours before landfall. 84  Although explanations for this hesitancy
82. See id.
83. See id. at 104. The New Orleans Plan provides:
"The authority to order the evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching
hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana statute." But this power "is also
delegated to each political subdivision of the State by Executive Order . . . . This
authority [also] empowers the chief elected official of New Orleans, the Mayor of New
Orleans, to order the evacuation of the parish residents threatened by an approaching
hurricane."
Id. (quoting City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, at 51 (2004)).
"Under this authority, the Mayor of New Orleans [and/or the Governor of Louisiana] is responsible
for giving the order for a mandatory evacuation and supervising the actual evacuation of [the]
population." Id. The Mayor's Office of Emergency Preparedness must "'[c]oordinate with the
State . . . on elements of evacuation"' and "'[a]ssist in directing the transportation of evacuees to
staging areas."' Id. at 104-05 (quoting City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan, at 54 (2004)). The importance of effective evacuations is expressed in the New
Orleans Plan, as it provides: "'The safe evacuation of threatened populations . . . is one of the
principle reasons for developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan."' Id. at 105
(quoting City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, at 48 (2004)). In
furtherance of that goal, "[tihe city of New Orleans will utilize all available resources to quickly and
safely evacuate threatened areas." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting City of New Orleans,
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, at 50 (2004)). Mississippi and Alabama have similar
evacuation plans, allocating authority and responsibility to a combination of state and local
government. See id. at 105-06. Additionally, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency
Assistance and Disaster Act (Louisiana Homeland Security Act) gives the governor overall
responsibility for emergency management in the state. Id. at 49. Among other responsibilities, the
governor is to "direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or
threatened areas within the state if deemed necessary for the preservation of life; and, prescribe
routes, modes of transportation, and destination in connection with evacuation." Id. (emphasis
added).
84. See id. at 108-09. Fifty-six hours before landfall, the National Weather Service (NWS)
predicted that the storm's projected path had shifted 150 miles west, and that Katrina would make
landfall as a Category 4 storm. Id. at 70. Six hours later, the NWS reported that the storm would
most likely make landfall 65 miles southeast of New Orleans, at Buras, Louisiana. Id. Katrina's
actual landfall occurred only 20 miles away from the NWS's forecast. Id. On the evening of August
27, National Hurricane Center (NHC) director Max Mayfield called Blanco and Nagin to warn them
of Katrina's likely effect on New Orleans. Id. Media reports indicate that Mayfield emphasized the
unprecedented level of destruction and urged Mayor Nagin to immediately order a mandatory
evacuation. See id. However, in his testimony before Congress, Mayfield stated he "'just told [the
officials] the nature of the storm [and that he] probably said to the Mayor that he was going to have
some very difficult decisions ahead of him."' Id. (quoting Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew
About Katrina and When, Hearing Before Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Max Mayfield,
Chairman of the National Hurricane Center)). AccuWeather Inc., a private weather service,
criticized the NHC for issuing its warning too late. See id. at 71. AccuWeather issued a report
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are not conclusively known, government officials have attributed the
hesitation to reservations about creating unnecessary traffic congestion.8 5
As late as the Saturday before the storm hit, news reports indicate that
Mayor Nagin was still conferring with his lawyers about the City's legal
liability to local businesses for lost revenues incurred due to a premature
evacuation of customers.86 It seems that state and local government delayed
the announcement of a mandatory evacuation in order to weigh the cost of
traffic jams and lost revenues against the lives of their constituents.87
The tardiness of evacuation orders caused evacuation efforts in New
Orleans to be largely incomplete.8 8 City officials, who were responsible for
executing evacuation plans, failed to evacuate or assist in the evacuation of
more than 70,000 individuals, who were effectively left behind to greet
Katrina's devastating surge. 89  Those left behind largely consisted of
residents who lacked the capability to evacuate, namely access to any means
of transportation. 90 Despite the knowledge that many residents would not be
able to evacuate on their own, officials chose to open the Superdome as a
shelter for those remaining in the area, rather than using the authority to
either commandeer resources or use "reasonable force" to completely
evacuate the remaining population, as the New Orleans Plan directed them
to do.91 The failure to execute a more complete evacuation of New Orleans
predicting the correct location of Katrina's landfall apporximately twelve hours before the NHC
issued its initial warning. Id. Neighboring Jefferson Parish never even ordered a mandatory
evacuation, except for in the lower parts of the Parish along the Gulf Coast. Id. at 110. While Parish
President Aaron Broussard stated that he did not have the "resources to enforce" a mandatory
evacuation, requests for supplemental state or federal funds to assist in evacuation efforts were never
made. Id. The mandatory evacuation was ordered in New Orleans about a day after most other
cities along the Gulf Coast had already evacuated. Evan Thomas, How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 26.
85. Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina and When, Hearing Before Select
Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th
Cong. (Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Max Mayfield, Chairman of the National Hurricane Center),
available at http://www.katrina.house.gov/hearings/0922-05/mayfieldO92205.pdf
86. Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at 1.
87. See id.; Mayfield, supra note 85.
88. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 11. In contrast to New Orleans, neighboring
Plaquemines Parish, in which officials ordered a mandatory evacuation on the morning of August
27, had an evacuation rate of ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent. Id. at 112. In New Orleans, at
least one nursing home was unable to evacuate its residents because they were unable to locate bus
drivers by the time the mandatory evacuation was ordered. Id. at 115.
89. Seeid. at 103.
90. Id. The small number of individuals who possessed the means to evacuate, but simply chose
not to, must also shoulder some of the blame for the difficulties stemming from the incomplete
evacuation. See id.
91. See id. at 103, 109-14. According to the New Orleans Plan, officials had authority to:
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led to catastrophic circumstances, as hundreds of people drowned in their
homes and in the streets as floodwaters rose above roof lines. 92  This
extraordinary disaster called for extraordinary measures-measures which
the local and state government failed to take. 93
B. Governmental Response Efforts
"The 'single biggest failure' of the federal response was that it failed to
recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize
federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the flooded city. If it had, then
federal assistance would have arrived several days earlier.,
94
"[D]irect and compel, by any necessary and reasonable force, the evacuation of all or
part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the City if he deems
this action necessary for the preservation of life, or for disaster mitigation, response, or
recovery" ... and that "[s]pecial arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable
to transport themselves or who require special life saving assistance."
Id. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan, at 45, 50 (2004)). In the face of a threatening hurricane, evacuation is extremely preferable to
sheltering within the affected area. See id. at 104. Sheltered populations are subject to the most
intense effects of the storm, and getting relief personnel and supplies into flooded areas can be a long
and arduous process. See id. It is also important to note that these New Orleans city officials had
the express authority to commandeer resources in order to assist in the evacuation effort. See id. at
103. The New Orleans Plan warns that "'[i]f an evacuation order is issued without the mechanisms
needed to disseminate the information to the affected persons, then we face the possibility of having
large numbers of people either stranded and left to the mercy of the storm, or left in areas impacted
by toxic materials."' Id. at 50 (quoting Office of Emergency Preparedness, City of New Orleans,
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, at 7 (2004)). Those who were evacuated to the
Superdome suffered through horrible conditions, as this sports arena was not designed "to house,
feed, and water thousands of people for several days." Id. at 117.
92. See id at 115. The incomplete evacuation led to the necessity for a post-hurricane evacuation
which federal, state, and city officials had neither prepared for nor anticipated. Id. at 104. This lack
of preparation caused crisis planning to be conducted under emergency circumstances, in which
communication and "situational awareness" were largely inadequate. Id.; see also Seed, et al., supra
note 7, at 2-22 (describing rising water levels in the aftermath of the storm).
93. As noted by the Select Committee:
[T]he failure to order a mandatory evacuation until Sunday, the decision to enforce that
order by "asking" people who had not evacuated to go to checkpoints for bus service, and
then using that bus service to take people only as far as the Superdome did not reflect the
publicly stated recognition that Hurricane Katrina would "most likely topple [the] levee
system" and result in "intense flooding" and "waters as high as 15 or 20 feet," rendering
large portions of the city uninhabitable.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at Ill (quoting Press Conference by C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New
Orleans, and Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, MSNBC, Aug. 28, 2005). As a result,
more than 70,000 people remained in the City to be rescued after the storm. Id. (citing Hearing on
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Hearing Before Select
Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th
Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) (written statement of Colonel Jeff Smith)).
94. Id. at 135 (emphasis added) (quoting Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and
Response by the State of Louisiana, Hearing Before Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of
Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana Office of Homeland
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An incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to the necessity for large-
scale post-landfall rescue and evacuation operations. 95  When Hurricane
Katrina made landfall on August 29, the 70,000 residents who were unable
to evacuate were either bused to the Superdome or other temporary
emergency shelters, forced to climb to their roofs and await rescue from
rising floodwaters, or left to fend for themselves in the flooded streets.
96
Orleans Parish coroner Dr. Frank Minyard estimated that twenty percent of
New Orleans' victims drowned in the floodwaters. 97 This implies that a
significant majority of Katrina's victims perished while awaiting rescue on
their roofs or in shelters.98 These individuals did not drown in Katrina's
waters. They died because they did not have access to supplies that could
fulfill their basic human needs: food, water, shelter, security, and
medicine. 9 9
In the days preceding Katrina, the federal government knew quite well
that a disaster of this magnitude would leave underfunded and overwhelmed
state and local authorities virtually helpless, and that federal assistance,
leadership, and coordination would be desperately needed in post-landfall
rescue efforts. 00 While this much is known, perhaps the greatest question
Security and Emergency Preparedness)).
95. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing pre-landfall evacuation efforts).
96. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 104. Many residents who were still inside their homes
when Katrina hit were forced to use tools and crude objects to chop through their rooftops to escape
the rising water. Id. at 116.
97. Id. at It5.
98. See id. As conditions inside the Superdome quickly began to deteriorate to unbearable
"third-world" conditions, residents who were sheltered there began to perish due to sickness,
starvation, and violence. See id. at 244. A National Guard report best illustrated the conditions
inside the Superdome after Katrina:
The water pressure declined steadily over the first several days and failed to provide toilet
functions on or about Wednesday the 31st of August. Unfortunately, many of the toilets
had overflowed by then and foot traffic distributed fecal material and urine throughout the
facility .... The warm temperature, combined with the floodwaters on the lower level,
rotting food and other refuse, human and animal (pets) waste material, and the aroma of
unwashed humans, produced an increasingly noxious smell in the place.
Id. (quoting Tiger Team Katrina Report, LA Nat'l Guard at 27 (Nov. 2, 2005)).
99. According to the Select Committee "Search and rescue efforts were
uncoordinated ... result[ing] in victims being left in shelters or out in the open on high ground for
days without food and water." Id. at 194.
100. In 2004, FEMA conducted a simulation known as the Hurricane PAM Exercise (PAM). Id.
at 81. PAM concluded that a Hurricane of Katrina's magnitude would cause the levees in New
Orleans to breach and be overtopped, inundate seventy-five percent of the city in waters up to twenty
feet, and cause approximately 60,000 deaths. Id. at 134. In the event of a storm such as Katrina,
PAM also concluded:
300,000 [sic] people would not evacuate in advance; 500,000 to 600,000 buildings would
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left unanswered in the minds of those who survived Hurricane Katrina is:
"What took the federal government so long to show up?"
This question seems to have the unfortunate result of leading to a
seemingly endless torrent of additional questions. In an age where the
United States has the ability to invade any foreign territory in the world
within eighteen hours by simply dispatching its 82nd Airborne,0 1 why did
the federal government fail to reach the streets of one of its own cities to
rescue citizens who were in desperate need of food, water, security, and
medical care before it was too late? 102 Why did our country's leadership fail
to act quickly and decisively while so many of its poor, sick, and elderly
citizens were rapidly perishing from sickness and starvation?0 3 Who within
our government was calling the shots? Who failed to act? An examination
of the roles and responsibilities of the federal government in responding to
catastrophic disasters can help shed light on these troubling questions.' 04
1. The Department of Homeland Security and FEMA
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress created
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to serve as an executive arm of
the federal government. 105 With the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002,
Congress consolidated the duties and responsibilities of various other
executive agencies, including those of the Federal Emergency Management
be destroyed; Phone and sewer services would be knocked out and chemical plants would
be flooded; 97 percent of all communications would be down; About 175,000 people
would be injured, 200,000 would become sick, and more than 60,000 would be killed;
About 1,000 shelters would be needed for evacuees; Boats and helicopters would be
needed for thousands of rescues because many residents would be stranded by
floodwaters; A catastrophic flood would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana
uninhabitable for more than a year.
Id. at 81; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing reports of Katrina's likely
devastation to officials from federal weather agencies).
101. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 561. The 82nd Airborne Division of the United States Army
is the world's most elite airborne fighting unit. See GlobalSecurity.org, 82nd Airborne Division,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/82abn.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). This
division is unique in its ability to be deployed by parachute to gain forcible entry into any area of the
world within eighteen hours. Id. Almost every piece of the division's combat equipment can also be
dropped onto the battlefield by parachute for immediate use. Id. The 82nd Airborne is the Army's
most powerful offensive force, and it maintains the highest level of combat readiness. Id.
102. To remain fair, it should be noted that the Army National Guard deployed troops to
Louisiana on the day after landfall, and rescued close to 2,000 evacuees. See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 32, at 205-06. Despite this heroic effort, the federal government failed to aid and assist an
overwhelming majority of the stranded population. See supra note 98 and accompanying text
(discussing the death toll during post-landfall evacuation).
103. See supra note 7 (discussing Katrina's death toll).
104. See discussion infra Part lI.B. 1-2 (discussing federal response efforts).
105. See 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2002).
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Agency (FEMA), under the umbrella of the DHS. 10 6  With FEMA now
operating as a department within the DHS, the DHS became the agency that
shouldered the primary responsibility for managing the national response to
domestic catastrophic disasters. 1
07
When responding to a domestic disaster, the DHS is required to follow
the guidelines set forth in the National Response Plan (NRP).I°5 The NRP
106. FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 30. Section 101 of the HSA reads:
This section establishes the Department of Homeland Security in the executive branch of
the United States government and defines its primary missions and responsibilities. The
primary missions of the department include preventing terrorist attacks within the United
States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home, and
minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any attacks that may occur.
The Department's primary responsibilities correspond to the five major functions
established by the bill within the Department: information analysis and infrastructure
protection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and related countermeasures;
border and transportation security; emergency preparedness and response; and
coordination with other parts of the federal government, with state and local
governments, and with the private sector. These primary missions and responsibilities are
not exhaustive, and the Department will continue to carry out other functions of the
agencies it will absorb.
Analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title I, Section 101, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/titlel.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (emphasis added) (explaining the
provisions of 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2002)). After the HSA, the DHS was now responsible for overseeing
FEMA in performing its duties. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 30. These duties, include, but
are not limited to:
(1) [E]nhancing the capability of state and local governments to respond to disasters; (2)
coordinating with other federal agencies that provide resources to respond to disasters;
(3) giving federal assistance directly to citizens recovering from disasters; (4) granting
financial assistance to state and local governments; and (5) providing leadership for
hazard mitigation through grants, flood plain management, and other activities.
Id. (citing Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 31670, Transfer of FEMA to the Department
of Homeland Security: Issues for Congressional Oversight, App. A: Summary of FEMA Authorities
(Dec. 17, 2002); U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/RCED-93-186, Disaster
Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic Disasters (July 23, 1993)).
107. FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 30.
108. Id. at 32. The NRP outlines the structure and mechanisms to be used for coordinating federal
support during emergencies. Id. It consolidates the framework of federal prevention, protection,
response, and recovery plans into one single operational plan to be used for all domestic emergency
response scenarios. Id. The NRP also provides procedures for the assistance of state and local
governments in disaster management scenarios, and defines situations where the federal government
is to provide support, as well as scenarios where it is to assume control. Id. It additionally organizes
equipment, resources, capabilities, and staffing in terms of functions that are most likely to be
needed during domestic disasters, such as effective communications and urban search and rescue.
Id. The NRP defines the administrative requirements and processes required for its implementation.
Id. It is intended to give federal, state, and local authorities an adjustable overall framework to be
used during emergencies in order to enable efficient and collaborative emergency management at all
levels. Id. Its aim is to allow rescuers from numerous agencies to effectively work together when
outlines specific procedures the DHS must follow when coordinating a
federal response to a domestic emergency.' 09 When domestic emergencies
requiring a federal response arise, the DHS directly responds through
Emergency Support Functions (ESF). For each of the different ESFs, the
DHS designates one primary federal agency, and often one or more support
agencies to lead the operation. 10 In domestic emergency management
situations, FEMA is usually the designated primary agency, and generally
serves as the primary vehicle through which the DHS responds."'
By declaring a disaster to be an "incident of national significance
(INS)," the DHS can trigger the federal government's most thorough
response."12 This designation is usually limited to catastrophic events that
will have a significant and prolonged effect on the country and easily
overwhelm state and local capabilities." 3 When a disaster is declared to be
managing domestic emergencies, regardless of their complexity, location, or size. Id.
109. See id.
110. d. at 33.
111. Id. The events of Hurricane Katrina shined a spotlight on FEMA's incapability to carry out
effective emergency response operations. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 29. In the storm's
aftermath, FEMA, along with its former director Michael Brown, have been among the primary
targets of public criticism and blame. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 13. Since its
incorporation into the DHS in 2002, the emergency management community has complained that
FEMA has been "systematically dismantled, stripped of authority and resources, and suffering from
low morale, in part because of the [DHS's] focus on terrorism." See id. at 151. Many cite the
decline of FEMA's disaster relief capabilities to a loss of qualified personnel, disaster specialists,
and senior leadership. See id. at 157. During rescue and aid operations, FEMA's manpower
shortage was compounded by a lack of security. See id. Of the one-thousand FEMA employees
deployed to New Orleans on August 31, many had to turn back due to security concerns. Id.; see
also Eric Lipton, White House Knew of Levee's Failure on Night of Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2006, at Al [hereinafter Lipton, White House] (adding to the list of FEMA's failures: "[There was]
no evidence that food and water supplies were formally ordered for the Convention Center, where
more than 10,000 evacuees had assembled .. "). Federally supplied food did not mobilize until the
Wednesday after Katrina hit, and the Superdome was out of food and water by Friday. Eric Lipton
et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at AI
[hereinafter Lipton, Breakdowns].
112. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 36. The NRP assigns the responsibility of declaring a
disaster to be an INS to the Secretary of the DHS. See id.
113. See id. The DHS defines an INS, or "catastrophic incident," as "'those high-impact events
that require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state,
local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage,
and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities."' Id. at 37
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, National Response Plan at CAT-I (Dec. 2004)).
Another DHS definition defines an INS/catastrophic event as:
Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels
of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic
event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost
immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal and private-sector
authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and
emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.
Id. at 36 (quoting U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/T-RCED-93-46, Disaster
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an INS, a component of the NRP known as the Catastrophic Incident Annex
(NRP-CIA) is put into effect.11 4 The invocation of the NRP-CIA allows the
federal government to switch from its standard "pull" system of response, to
a more urgent "push" system.' 15  Under a "push" system, the federal
government can bypass the usual requirement of waiting to receive an
official request for assistance from state and local governments, and
immediately dispatch a proactive response on its own initiative. 116 The
moment an INS is declared and the NRP-CIA is invoked, the DHS must
immediately begin to provide assistance to overwhelmed state and local
governments through the designated federal agencies that correspond to the
needed ESF. " Additionally, the declaration of an INS allows the
Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy 43
(May 25, 1993)). The Secretary is required to declare a disaster to be an INS the moment it is
known that the criteria are met. See id. at 37. The text of the NRP states, "'Upon recognition that a
catastrophic incident condition ... exists, the Secretary of DHS immediately designates the event an
INS and begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, implementation
of the NRP-CIA."' Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (quoting Dep't of Homeland Security, National
Response Plan at CAT-4 (Dec. 2004)).
114. Id. at 36. The DHS characterizes the NRP-CIA as "establishing the context and overarching
strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to certain
catastrophic disasters." Id. (emphasis added). After the declaration of an INS, the DHS is also
required to convene the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG). Id. at 37. This group
consists of high level professionals from governmental and non-governmental agencies with
decision making authority. Id. at 38. The IIMG is convened in order to anticipate the needs and
requirements of the response effort, and make strategic recommendations to the DHS and the White
House. Id. at 134. With the declaration of an INS, the Secretary is also required to designate a
Principal Federal Officer (PFO) to manage the response. Id. at 14. The PFO serves as the primary
point of contact and source of situational awareness for the Secretary in the event of an INS. See id.
at 135.
115. Id. at 31. When responding to natural disasters that do not arise to the level of an INS, the
federal government operates under a "pull" system, and only provides assistance in response to
official requests from state and local authorities. Id. at 30. In situations such as these, it is assumed
that state and local authorities are in the best position to know the exact type and amount of needed
assistance, and the federal government accordingly awaits the request so it knows the correct type
and quantity of resources to send prior to deployment. See id. These requests can be made either
before or after the natural disaster occurs. Id. During an INS however, it is assumed that state and
local governments are overwhelmed, and therefore unable to or incompetent to make an official
request for assistance. See id. at 31. In these situations, the federal government switches to a "push"
system, and proactively provides relief without waiting for specific requests to be made. Id.
116. Id. During an INS, the federal government may have to mobilize and deploy troops and
assets before local and state authorities make official requests through the usual protocols. Id. at 36.
In catastrophic situations of this sort, the DHS must act quickly, as federal support will most likely
be needed in order "to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate severe damage." Id.
117. See id. The DHS is to provide expedited assistance to state and local authorities by providing
services and commodities including, but not limited to: food, water, emergency first aid, onsite
medical treatment, medical equipment and supplies, urban search and rescue, decontamination,
shelter, housing, casualty management, transportation for the deceased or injured, and human
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Department of Defense (DOD) to dispatch federal military troops to assist
with disaster relief and security. 8
With these policies in place, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff had the
responsibility to acknowledge Katrina's catastrophic power as it approached
the Gulf Coast (as well as the certainty that city and local governments
would be overwhelmed) and declare the storm to be an INS before it even
made landfall. "'9 As discussed above, the federal government had sufficient
knowledge to classify Katrina as an INS two days prior to landfall, 120 and
Chertoff should have made the declaration the moment the information
became known.' 21 By that time, it seemed to be obvious to everyone but
Chertoff that the worst case scenario was about to happen. 
22
Had the Secretary acted in accordance with his official duties set forth in
the NRP, federal assistance would have arrived in New Orleans much
earlier, 23 and the DHS could have provided much needed assistance to city
and state officials so that a complete mandatory pre-landfall evacuation
could have been successfully staged. 24 At a bare minimum, Chertoff should
have declared an INS by the time landfall actually occurred, so that federal
assistance could have been in place to carry out an adequately proactive
post-landfall evacuation. Sadly, for reasons that are difficult to comprehend,
he failed to do even this. 1
25
services. Id. The DHS acknowledges that response activities may have to begin without the benefit
of a complete and detailed assessment of situational needs, as this information may not be clear for
twenty-four hours or longer after the incident. Id.
118. See id. at 38-39.
119. See supra notes 108-14 (discussing Secretary's responsibilities under NRP); see also FINAL
REPORT, supra note 32, at 131.
120. See supra notes 84, 100 and accompanying text (discussing forecasts of Katrina's severity
made by two separate federal weather agencies and PAM exercise).
121. See supra notes 108-14 (discussing Chertoff's guidelines under NRP); see also FINAL
REPORT, supra note 32, at 131.
122. By this time, the governors of both Louisiana and Mississippi had declared state
emergencies, and the President had issued an emergency declaration for Louisiana. FINAL REPORT,
supra note 32, at 134.
123. See id. at 134-35.
124. See discussion infra Part l.A.2 (discussing inadequacies ofpre-landfall evacuation).
125. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 131. According to a letter submitted by the DHS in
response to criticism regarding its actions during Katrina, the DHS viewed the NRP-CIA as only
applicable to "no-notice" or "short notice" events. Id. The text of the NRP-CIA itself, however,
states that a catastrophic incident may occur with "little or no warning." Id.
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Secretary Chertoff did not declare Katrina to be an INS until two days
after it ravaged New Orleans, 26 and post-landfall evacuation and rescue
efforts were severely undermined as a result. 127  Had Chertoff declared an
INS at the time he was required to do so, 128 the DOD's military involvement
would have been accelerated, and plans to pre-stage aircraft, busses, and
boats for the evacuation of the City and the Superdome could have been put
into effect. 2 9  Katrina made landfall on August 29, and federal assistance
did not arrive until September 2. 130 At this point, it was already too late for
a significant amount of people.'' Federal troops did not arrive in the
disaster areas until around five days after landfall. 3 2  Armed gangs and
looters, like television crews, arrived much quicker. 133  The federal
126. Id. at 12. By comparing the events preceding Katrina to those preceding Hurricane Rita, the
importance of a timely INS declaration becomes apparent. Hurricane Rita made landfall near the
Texas-Louisiana border on September 24, 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane. Hurricane Rita,
Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane.rita#Louisiana (last visited Feb. 27,
2007). Rita caused $11.3 billion in damage to the Gulf Coast region. Id. The federal government
declared Hurricane Rita an INS two days prior to landfall. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 12.
Evacuation efforts were far more successful in the anticipation of this hurricane. See id. at 12-13.
Ten-thousand National Guardsmen were brought into Texas in anticipation of this storm, while a
dismal 1,500 were summoned prior to Katrina. Id. More supplies were stockpiled on the ground
prior to Rita than prior to Katrina as well. Id. at 12. Had the DHS declared Katrina to be an INS as
it did in anticipation of Rita, countless lives could have been saved. Id.
127. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (discussing DHS's failures during response
effort). Critics cite Chertoff's decision to appoint FEMA director Michael Brown as PFO as one of
the principal forces behind the inadequate response. See FINAL REPORT supra 32, at 135. Brown
had not completed the required PFO training, and was not even listed on the roster of approved
candidates. Id.
128. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary's responsibility
under the NRP).
129. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 134.
130. Jackson, supra note 28, at 567.
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing lives lost while awaiting rescue).
132. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 30. According to the Select Committee:
The Louisiana National Guard and DOD active duty forces, under Joint Task Force
Katrina, were under separate commands . . . attempts to bring them under the same
command were rejected . . . result[ing] in delays in the arrival of DOD active duty
troops-troops that provided a robust reservoir of manpower and a wide array of
capabilities.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 195.
133. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 30. Within a day of landfall, only around thirty police officers
were left to fight off looters and riots in the city. Id. General violence, rioting, and looting
immediately broke out in crowded areas where residents were uncertain of their chances for survival,
evacuation, or rescue. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 241. Looting occurred in several
locations. Id. In some cases, residents broke into stores to obtain items necessary for survival such
as food, water, clothing, flashlights, and batteries. Id. Other looters broke into businesses to take
government failed to exercise "situational awareness"' 3 4 during a critical
time, and hundreds of Americans lost their lives as a result. 1
35
2. The White House
Some amount of fault should be allocated to the White House as well. 136
The Stafford Act provides that the President is "Commander-in-Chief" of
the military's actions during disaster response efforts, just as he is during
times of war. 137 Accordingly, President Bush could have exercised this
authority to override Chertoff's hesitance in order to deploy military troops
at an earlier time. '38 Even though the White House received a FEMA report
confirming that the levees had in fact breached on the day Katrina hit, it did
not consider this assessment "confirmed" for eleven hours.'3 9  The Select
Committee concluded that "the President's Homeland Security team did not
effectively substantiate, analyze, and act on the information at its
disposal."' 140  An analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina reveals poor judgment and undue hesitancy at all levels of
government. 14' Government entities failed to effectively coordinate
adequate preparation and response efforts, and the people of New Orleans
paid the ultimate cost.
resale items and electronic devices. Id.
134. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 27.
135. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing death toll during post-landfall
evacuation).
136. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 132 (discussing presidential roles and responsibilities
during major disasters).
137. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 5170a (2000) ("In any major disaster, the President may--() direct any
Federal agency . . . to utilize its authorities and . . . resources . . . in support of State and local
assistance efforts; (2) coordinate all disaster relief assistance . . . (4) assist State and local
governments in... emergency assistance.").
138. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 132. President Bush himself has publicly admitted that
the federal government's response to hurricane Katrina was "slow and inadequate." See Bush
Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16, 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/16/europe/web.0915katl.php. In a speech given at Jackson
Square in New Orleans seventeen days after Katrina made landfall, Bush stated, "The system at
every level of government, was not well coordinated and was overwhelmed in the first few days."
President George W. Bush, Speech at Jackson Square, New Orleans (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/15bush.transcript/ [hereinafter Jackson Square Speech].
139. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 132. The report stated, "'[My] initial flyover lasted
about 10 minutes and even in that short time I was able to see that approximately 80 percent of the
city was under water, and I confirmed the 17th Street Canal levee break."' Id. at 142 (quoting
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, A Chaotic Response, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Oct. 20, 2005) (testimony of
Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, FEMA)).
140. Id. at 143.
141. See supra notes 28-140 and accompanying text (discussing government failures during
Katrina).
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III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: NEGLIGENCE, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY,
AND "ACTS OF GOD"
A. Negligence Defined
No one can contest the fact that the citizens of New Orleans suffered an
insurmountable amount of harm in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
142
Whether their property was destroyed 143 or their loved ones taken, 144 only
just compensation can begin to make these citizens whole again. 145 But
what is a New Orleanian to do? Does he or she have a valid legal claim? If
so, who should the claim be brought against? 1
46
A cause of action alleging negligence is the obvious legal remedy that
first comes to mind. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, negligence is
"[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation."' 147  Another common
definition of negligence is "conduct that falls below the standard of care
established by law for the protection of others against the unreasonable risk
of harm." 48 In order to assert a successful common-law cause of action for
negligence, a plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant owed a duty of care to
plaintiff, 149 (2) defendant breached that duty, 5 0 (3) defendant's conduct was
the cause of plaintiffs injury,' 1 and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a
142. See supra note 7 (discussing harm caused by Katrina).
143. See supra note II (discussing property damage).
144. See supra note 7 (discussing lives taken).
145. Monetary damages are largely the only available remedy, as grieving residents cannot be
reuinited with their lost loved ones.
146. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (addressing this question).
147. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
148. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 130 (10th ed.
2000).
149. Id. This duty is "an obligation recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks." Id.
150. Id. A defendant has "breached" this duty when his actions have failed to conform to the
legally required standard of conduct. See id.
151. Id. Causation entails "[a] reasonably close causal connection between the conduct" in
question and "the resulting injury." Id. Causation is a "combination of two elements" which must
both be sufficiently established: "causation in fact and legal or 'proximate' causation." Id. To
satisfy the "causation in fact" prong, plaintiff must prove that "but-for" defendant's conduct, the
resultant injury would not have occurred. See Perkins v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R., 147 So. 2d 646,
649 (La. 1962). "Legal causation" is a concept that can cut off liability even where defendant's
conduct was a "cause in fact." SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 290. As a rather complex legal
concept, legal causation is often defined as "[a] cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability,"
or "an act or omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be
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result of the breach.152 Without proving all of these elements, a negligence
claim cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.'53
Before claimants can argue these elements in court, they must choose a
proper defendant to bring suit against. It is interesting to note that a sort of
"best case scenario" exists for a plaintiff when his or her Katrina-related
damages were caused by a private company or person, and the most
conventional tort suits that can be brought are those involving damages from
oil spills.154 Numerous class action lawsuits alleging negligence have been
filed against private oil and gas operators, such as Shell Pipeline and
Chevron, for spills that occurred during Katrina.' 55 In addition to these
types of claims, there exists a potential for negligence claims to be brought
against nursing homes and private healthcare facilities in which many people
died during the storm or during evacuation efforts. 156  Negligence claims
imposed on the actor." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 147, at 234. Legal causation
generally does not exist when the resultant harm from defendant's actions was too unforeseeable at
the time the action was taken or when there were legally sufficient intervening acts that broke the
chain of causation stemming from the original action. See id. at 234-35. Accordingly, "[a] person
must foresee the normal consequences of his conduct, but is not responsible for extraordinarily
negligent intervening acts of third persons." SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 322. It is
important to note that the elements which must be proved in order to complete a negligence cause of
action under Louisiana state law are identical to those of the common law. See Manard et al., supra
note 56, at 32.
152. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 130. To fulfill the last prong, "[a]ctual loss or
damage resulting to the interests of another" must be shown. Id.
153. See infra note 221 (discussing government motions to dismiss that claimants will face).
154. See Manard et al., supra note 56, at 32. Hurricane Katrina's storm surges caused countless
oil tanks owned by private oil and gas operators to spill into bodies of water and onto private
property. See id.
155. Id. More than twenty class action lawsuits have been filed against Murphy Oil and related
entities to recover damages from oil spilled from an 85,000 barrel oil tank in Meraux, Louisiana. Id.
Another class action lawsuit has been filed against Shell Pipeline, Chevron, and other oil and gas
operators on behalf of a large group of commercial fisherman who depended on waterways that were
contaminated from oil spills at seven separate facilities in southeastern Louisiana. Id. In addition to
alleging negligence, many of these lawsuits also assert liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., which in addition to property damages, provides for the recovery
of revenue losses, lost profits, and diminished earning capacities relating to property damage, as well
as for the loss of the use of natural resources. Id. While some of these claims also assert liability
under theories of strict and absolute liability, amendments to Louisiana's Civil Code from a 1996
tort reform package make recovery under these theories quite difficult. Id. Louisiana state law now
only imposes strict liability "upon a showing that [defendant] knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known" of the injury-causing defect. Id. The same reform package limits absolute
liability for ultrahazardous activities to pile-driving or blasting with explosives. Id. Because of the
difficulty entailed in succeeding under strict or absolute liability theories, negligence and OPA suits
will likely be the primary battlegrounds for litigation over Katrina-related oil spills. Id. Louisiana
state law also recognizes the doctrine of res ipa loquitor, which could prove helpful to plaintiffs in
future Katrina litigation. Id. at 33. This doctrine creates a legal inference of negligence when the
circumstances demonstrate that the only possible or reasonable explanation for the damages is
defendant's conduct. Id.
156. Id. As many of these facilities were not fully evacuated before the storm hit, future
negligence lawsuits filed against the facilities and their insurers could highlight negligent conduct in
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against private companies are somewhat straightforward, as plaintiffs must
simply satisfy the required elements of the tort. 1
5 7
But what is to become of residents who are either unable to collect from
an insolvent company, or simply do not have the luxury of having a private
party as the source of their damages? Can these estranged citizens now
bring suit against the governmental bodies that failed them? In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, local, state, and federal governmental bodies and
agencies have been rendered the only possible sources of recovery for many
New Orleans residents. Citizens who bring suit against the government have
an arduous road ahead of them, however, as a series of high hurdles lie in
their path to recovery. 158
B. The King Can Do No Wrong
A discussion of the pebbles which litter the road to recovery in Katrina
litigation should begin by addressing the supreme boulder. Since the late
1700s, the idea that "the King can do no wrong" has existed in our legal
framework in the form of the "sovereign immunity" doctrine. 5 9 The
the creation of emergency preparedness plans, evacuation efforts, and treatment of patients in the
wake of the storm. Id.
157. These defendants will likely attempt to assert the "act of God" defense in these suits. See
discussion infra Part ll.C (discussing the "act of God" defense to tort liability). This defense has
failed in the past on a number of occasions, as federal courts have reasoned that hurricanes striking
hurricane-prone areas during hurricane season cannot be considered "unanticipated." See Apex Oil
Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 653 (E.D. La. 2002). Additionally, two Louisiana
appellate courts have recently held in past hurricane-related cases that the act of God defense cannot
shield a defendant from claims for the cost of removing his displaced property from the property
where it came to rest after the storm. See, e.g., Allen v. Simon, 888 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (La. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that defendant was liable for costs connected with the removal of a tree that fell from
his property onto his neighbor's house); Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co. v. J.R. Gray Barge Co., 803 So.
2d 86, 94 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that defendant is liable for cost of removing its barge that
was swept away onto plaintiff's marshland property). The actual recovery of damages could prove
to be problematic however, as the insurance coverage and assets of most private companies will be
quite modest in comparison to the massive scope of damages. See supra notes 7, 11 (discussing
damage sustained during Katrina).
158. See discussion infra Part 11l.B-C (discussing hurdles to recovery).
159. See Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1973), superseded by statute,
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (West
2007). It is widely acknowledged that the historical roots of the doctrine of sovereign immunity can
be found in the English case Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). Id. In Russell,
reflecting the then prevalent societal view of the individual in relation to his government, Justice
Ashurst noted that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should
suffer an inconvenience." 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. The Russell court also pointed to the absence of a
fund "out of which satisfaction is to be made." Id. It has also been suggested that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity partially stemmed from the early English courts' circular reasoning interpreting
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reasoning behind the creation of this early English doctrine, allied closely
with the concept of the "divine right of kings," was that it was necessarily a
contradiction of the King's sovereignty to allow him to be sued in his own
courts. 160 After its conception in early English common law, this idea that
governmental bodies are immune from tort liability was soon adopted in the
United States. 1
61
For a significant period of time the federal government was immune
from any and all liability in tort, 162 and it was "axiomatic that the United
States may not be sued without its consent." 163 It was not until the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1949 (FTCA) that the United States waived its immunity
to tort actions under certain circumstances. 1 64 By enacting the FTCA,
Congress effectively waived the immunity to civil suits enjoyed by the
federal government, 165 and provided that:
[Federal district courts] shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 
166
the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 210 (1963). The courts acknowledged that respondeat
superior was based on the concept of "principle" and "agent," and that all government employees
were "agents" of the King. Id. They reasoned that because the King himself could not commit a
tort, the theory failed for lack of a valid principal. Id.
160. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 638.
161. Ayala, 305 A.2d at 880. While the reasoning for the initial acceptance of this feudal and
monarchistic doctrine by the United States is largely obscure and unclear to legal scholars, some
justifications have been set forth. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 638. As Justice Holmes
noted in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
162. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 639.
163. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (discussing the doctrine of sovereign
immunity). The sovereign immunity doctrine has been widely criticized in the American legal
community throughout history. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing criticism
of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
164. Id. It is important to note that the FTCA is afederal Act, and thus does not apply to state and
local governments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1997). Each state has its own laws regarding
sovereign immunity. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity
in relevant Gulf Coast states).
165. Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 1998).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
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This waiver came along with what is commonly known as the
"discretionary function exception," however.167 The discretionary function
exception retains governmental immunity from liability for civil claims
"based upon the exercise or performance ... [of] a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."'' 68  Essentially, when
governmental actions are discretionary in nature, sovereign immunity locks
on, and all acts and omissions are immune from judicial review.' 69
In response to confusion surrounding the discretionary function
exception, the Supreme Court articulated a workable standard for lower
courts to apply. 70  In Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, Justice
Marshall presented a two-prong test to be used in determining when the
discretionary function exception applies.' First, a court must consider if
the governmental action in question involved an element of judgment or
167. Deuser, 139 F.3d at 1192-93.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). In its entirety, this section covers:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id. This exception to the FTCA "marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort
liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from
exposure to suit by private individuals." United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984).
The Supreme Court first addressed the discretionary function exception in Dalehite v. United States.
346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the Court construed the exception quite broadly, and retained
immunity for any decisions which originated at the executive level. Id. at 36. The Court reasoned
that while the FTCA holds the government liable in situations where a private person would be
liable, it precludes liability for activities exclusive to government in which a private citizen could not
engage. See id. at 27-28. Upholding sovereign immunity to a level almost equivalent to the pre-
FTCA era, the Dalehite Court held that "[i]t necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable." Id. at
36. Many years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court once again addressed the discretionary function
exception in Varig. 467 U.S. at 797. In Varig, the Court attempted to clarify the scope of the
exception after recognizing that in interpreting the exception, the Supreme Court's reading of the
FTCA had not "followed a straight line." Id. at 811. While the Varig Court did attempt to set forth
factors to test the applicability of the discretionary function exception, the "factors" were left largely
unarticulated, and the exception's scope remained largely undefined. Nathan Smith, Comment,
Water, Water Everywhere, and Not a Bite to Eat: Sovereign Immunity, Federal Disaster Relief and
Hurricane Katrina, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 699, 711 (2006).
169. McWaters v. FEMA, 408 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228 (E.D. La. 2005), modified, 408 F. Supp. 2d
221 (E.D. La. 2006), and dismissed in part, 436 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. La. 2006).
170. See Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
171. Id. at 536. The Berkovitz Court expanded upon Varig in order to clarify the scope of the
discretionary function exception. See id.
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choice on the part of a government actor. 112 The exception cannot apply if a
relevant federal statute, policy, or regulation outlines a specific course of
action for the actor to follow. 7 3  Second, if the challenged conduct does
involve an element of judgment, that judgment must be of the type the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield. 7 4  In sum, the
Berkovitz Court provided that immunity can only attach if (1) the
government act was the result of a decision involving an element of
judgment, and (2) the judgment was based on considerations of public
policy. 7 5  If the government fails to act in accordance with a specific,
mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception cannot apply. 1
76
For a tort claim against the federal government to survive a motion to
dismiss,'77 a plaintiff must show that the conduct in question does not fall
within the discretionary function exception. 1
78
Sovereign immunity exists at state and local levels as well. The
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars actions against
a state in federal court absent consent, waiver, or abrogation of the state's
sovereign immunity. 179 The Louisiana Constitution waives immunity in tort
for the State and all political subdivisions of the State. 180 The Constitutions
of Mississippi'' and Alabama 8 2 have not waived state sovereign immunity
172. Id.
173. Id. The first prong of the test involves an inquiry of whether a statute or regulation provides
a "'fixed or readily ascertainable standard"' to guide the decision maker in performing his duties.
Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11 th Cir. 1993) (quoting Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11 th Cir. 1985)). A statute or regulation meets this standard if
it "mandates that a government agent perform his or her function in a specific manner." Id. at 1124-
25.
174. Berkovitz, 486 U.S at 536-37. The Court further noted, "[t]he basis for the discretionary
function exception was Congress' desire to 'prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of
an action in tort."' Id. (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
175. Id. at 537. There exists a "strong presumption" that an act authorized by a regulation
involves considerations of public policy if the regulation expressly allows employee discretion.
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991).
176. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
177. See infra note 221 (discussing motions for judgment on the pleadings).
178. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.").
180. LA. CONST. art. XII § 10. Personal injury and wrongful death judgments are statutorily
capped at $500,000. LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 13:5106(B) (2006). This cap applies to each person
suffering an injury, or each decedent in a wrongful death case. Id. Additionally, "[n]o suit against
the state or a state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a
Louisiana state court." Id. § 13:5106(A).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A (1965).
182. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14. ("[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any
court of law or equity.").
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for tort liability. The immunity of local governmental bodies to be sued in
tort has been waived in Louisiana 183 and Alabama. 184 Mississippi has not
yet waived local tort immunity. 85
If Katrina claimants have the good fortune of getting past the first hurdle
of sovereign immunity 8 6 in their suits against the government, they must
next find their way around Section 702c of the Flood Control Act of 1928
(Flood Control Act).' 87 This provision states: "No liability of any kind shall
attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or
flood waters at any place .... ,188 The Flood Control Act was enacted in
conjunction with the federal government's decision to take on primary
responsibility for a series of flood control projects after the Great Mississippi
Flood of 1927.189 Courts have traditionally interpreted the words "floods or
flood waters" to mean "all water that flows through a federal facility that
was designed and is operated, at least in part, for flood control purposes."' 90
183. See Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 174 So. 2d 529, 531-32 (La. 1965) (holding that the state
Constitution waived immunity for local government bodies).
184. See Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68, 75 (Ala. 1975) (abolishing the doctrine of
municipal immunity).
185. See McGrath v. City of Gautier, 794 So. 2d 983 (Miss. 2001) (applying the doctrine of
municipal immunity).
186. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity).
187. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2000).
188. Id.
189. Manard et al., supra note 56, at 35; see infra note 250 (discussing the Great Mississippi
Flood of 1927). The initial reasoning for enacting the Flood Control Act involved:
plac[ing] a limit on the amount of money that Congress would spend in connection with
flood control programs. Congress undoubtedly realized that the cost of extensive flood
control projects would be great and determined that those costs should not have added to
them the floodwater damages that might occur in spite of federal flood control
efforts .... "[1]mmunity from liability for floodwater damage arising in connection with
flood control works was the condition upon which the government decided to enter into
the area of nationwide flood control programs."
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 (E.D. La. 2007) (quoting
Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1971)).
190. Manard et al., supra note 56, at 35. In United States v. James, plaintiffs' injuries were
caused by the federal government's negligent failure to warn of "the release of flood waters from
reservoirs that had reached flood stage." 478 U.S. 597, 601, 604 (1986), overruled by Cent. Green
Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425 (2001). Holding that the Flood Control Act barred plaintiffs'
claims, the Supreme Court stated:
The [Flood Control] Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry floodwaters. It
is thus clear from § 702c's plain language that the terms "flood" and "flood waters" apply
to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes
of or related toflood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control.
Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
This provision often prevents recovery where liability would otherwise be
imposed on the federal government under the FTCA for negligence linked to
federal flood control projects. 191
Due to the growing concern that it was not Congress' intention to create
"complete immunity from liability for the negligent and wrongful acts of
[government] employees unconnected with flood control projects,"'192 the
Supreme Court subsequently adjusted the standard set forth in United States
v. James. 193 In Central Green Co. v. United States, the Court held that when
interpreting the Flood Control Act, courts should consider "the character of
the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than the relation between
that damage and a flood control project."' 194  Thus, the concept that the
government may be liable for damages caused by certain floodwaters but not
others was officially recognized for the first time.195 Although it does not
directly address the required nexus between floodwaters and a federal flood
control project needed for immunity to attach, 196 Central Green Co. requires
courts to consider the true nature of the flood damage, rather than basing its
decision entirely on the fact that a flood control project was involved.' 97
C. When God Acts
In addition to overcoming the doctrine of sovereign immunity' 98 and the
Flood Control Act,' 99 a final obstacle remains in the path to recovery against
the government. In upcoming Katrina litigation, a governmental entity may
191. Id. at 598-99.
192. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 471 F. Supp. at 691.
193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing standard set forth in James).
194. Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001). In Central Green Co., plaintiffs
sued the United States under the FTCA for damages sustained by their pistachio farm caused by
water flooding from a federally owned canal. Id. at 427. The canal was designed and usually used
for flood control purposes. See id. The property damage was accrued over a long period of time "in
part by flood waters and in part by the routine use of the canal when it contained little more than a
trickle." Id. at 436. Plaintiffs alleged that the damage was attributable to the government's
negligence in designing, constructing, and maintaining the canal. Id. at 427. In overturning the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court distinguished the current situation from the facts of
James, and held "in determining whether § 702c immunity attaches, courts should consider the
character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather than the relation between that damage
and a flood control project" Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
195. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 694 ("Thus, the concept that the
Government might be immune from damage from the effect of some water and not as to other water
is recognized in Central Green.").
196. Id. at 695 ("Central Green does not directly answer the question of what nexus to a flood
control project is required for floodwaters to trigger immunity.").
197. Id. ("[I]n reality Central Green requires the Court to identify the cause of damage rather than
base a decision on the mere fact that a flood control project was involved.").
198. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity).
199. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Flood Control Act).
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also attempt to assert the "act of God" defense.200 Through this defense, it
can be argued that an "act of God" or "force of nature" occurred with such
significant force that it constituted an intervening force or superseding cause,
thus breaking the chain of causation linking the original wrongdoer to the
injury.2°' It is important to note, however, that "[o]ne who fails in his duty
to remedy a defective or dangerous condition is liable for injuries resulting
therefrom, although the immediate cause of the injury is the ['act of
God']. 2 °2
200. The act of God defense has been employed in negligence and strict liability cases for around
three-hundred years. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 566 (citing Denis Binder, Act of God? Or Act of
Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 (1996)). The act of
God defense received prominence in early English decisions concerning strict liability for common
carriers. Id. at 6. In a unanimous late eighteenth century opinion, Lord Mansfield established "acts
of God" as a defense to tort liability, and noted that the burden of proof shifts from plaintiff to
defendant in proving the defense:
After stating the case-The question is, whether the common carrier is liable in this case
of fire? It appears from all the cases for 100 years back, that there are events for which
the carrier is liable independent of his contract. By the nature of his contract, he is liable
for all due care and diligence; and for any negligence he is suable on his contract. But
there is a further degree of responsibility by the custom of the realm, that is, by the
common law; a carrier is in the nature of an insurer. It is laid down that he is liable for
every accident, except by the act of God, or the King's enemies. Now what is the act of
God? I consider it to mean something in opposition to the act of man: for every thing is
the act of God that happens by His permission; every thing, by His knowledge. But to
prevent litigation, collusion, and the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to
be unravelled, the law presumes against the carrier, unless he shews it was done by the
King's enemies or by such act as could not happen by the intervention of man, as storms,
lightning, and tempests.
Forward v. Pittard, 99 Eng. Rep. 953, 956-57 (1785) (holding that carrier was absolved of liability
because damage caused by fire was deemed an "act of God"). Early courts acknowledged that
liability would in fact exist if the carrier knew the act of God was coming. Ralph S. Bauer, Common
Carrier's Negligent Delay Plus Act of God, 8 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394, 395 (1933). Courts
eventually extended the act of God defense to negligence actions. See Nichols v. Marsland, 10 L.R.-
Ex. 255 (1875). In Nichols, the courts absolved liability for damages caused when defendant's dam
failed during a powerful storm, as Lord Justice Mellish noted:
In this case I understand the jury to have found that all reasonable care had been taken by
the defendant ... that the storm was of such violence as to be properly called the act of
God, or vis major .... Had the banks been twice as strong, or if that would not do, ten
times, and ten times as high, and the weir ten times as wide, the mischief might not have
happened. But those are not practical conditions, they are such that to enforce them
would prevent the reasonable use of property in the way most beneficial to the
community.
Id. at 258-59. The "act of God" defense was adopted by American Courts in the late 1800s. See
Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416, 422-23 (1868) (following principles set forth in Forward).
201. See Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 59 A.2d 68, 71 (Pa. 1948) (holding defendant liable
for damages caused when his negligently maintained roof collapsed as a result of extremely high
winds).
202. Id. at 72; see also Bowman v. Columbia Tel. Co., 179 A.2d 197, 202 (Pa. 1962) (holding
Generally, the act of God defense entails two specific requirements: "the
unforeseeability [of the event] by reasonable human intelligence, and the
absence of a human agency causing the alleged damage. 2 °3 Recognized by
Louisiana law as well as the common law, this defense absolves liability
when a defendant can prove that the injury is due directly and exclusively to
unanticipated natural causes without human intervention, and that his or her
negligent conduct did not contribute to the incident.2°4 A plaintiff may
overcome this defense by conclusively showing that "the act of God
coalesces with an act of the defendant, 20 5 and that man helped God along
the way.
The government will have a wide array of immunities and defenses at its
disposal in upcoming Katrina litigation.2 °6 In order to survive a motion to
dismiss, 20 7 a negligence claim against the government will have to withstand
the sovereign immunity doctrine, the Flood Control Act, and the "act of
God" defense. Katrina plaintiffs must persuade judges that these immunities
and defenses do not apply to the facts at hand if their claims are to succeed
in court.20 8 As many obstacles complicate Katrina litigation, the road to
recovery will require persistence, creative advocacy, and equitable judicial
decision-making.20 9
defendant telephone company liable for damages caused when a telephone pole which was not
inspected for fourteen years fell during a snowstorm).
203. Jackson, supra note 28, at 566 (citing Binder, supra note 200, at 13). Thus, if a similar event
has occurred in the past, could have been anticipated through the use of modem technology, or was
otherwise reasonably foreseeable, the act of God defense will not preclude liability even if the event
was not probable. Binder, supra note 200, at 13. The test is not whether the event's occurrence was
likely or probable, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable. Id. Consequently, the defense is
construed narrowly, and is limited to "truly unforeseeable events," rather than "unusual, but not
unprecedented" ones. Id. In more recent times, the Alabama Supreme Court explained that "[in its
legal sense an 'act of God' applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that the history of
climatic variations and other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of
them." Bradford v. Stanley, 355 So. 2d 328, 330 (Ala. 1978). For the defense to apply, the injury
must also occur "by the direct, immediate, and exclusive operations of the forces of nature,
uncontrolled or uninfluenced by the power of man and without human intervention." Butts v. City
of S. Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
204. Manard et al., supra note 56, at 32.
205. See Binder, supra note 200, at 17. If the damage is caused by both "an act of God" and the
negligent act, the defendant remains liable. Id. at 17-18.
206. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (discussing sovereign immunity); notes 187-
97 and accompanying text (discussing the Flood Control Act); notes 200-05 and accompanying text
(discussing the "act of God" defense).
207. See infra note 221 (discussing motions for judgment on the pleadings).
208. See discussion infra Part IV.B (presenting arguments to bypass sovereign immunity in
Katrina litigation).
209. See discussion infra Part IV.
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IV. COMPLETING THE TORT: ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CLAIMS TO
BE BROUGHT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
A. Cause ofAction for Governmental Negligence
When evaluating the actions taken by federal, state, and local
governmental entities in anticipation of and response to Hurricane Katrina,
instances of inept judgment, undue hesitation, irresponsibility, and improper
prioritizing can be found at virtually every stage and every level.2 10 The
policy decisions made by these governing bodies, or in some cases the
decisions that they did not make, 2 ' either contributed to or caused an
unprecedented number of American citizens to lose their homes, lives, or
loved ones to Katrina's wrath.2t 2 Left with nothing but unanswered
questions and the clothes on their backs, many Katrina survivors' only
chance for salvation lies in bringing a negligence cause of action against the
governmental entities that failed them. 2 3 To analyze the potential for such a
210. See discussion supra Part 1I (discussing governmental ineptitude and misjudgment
concerning actions during Hurricane Katrina).
211. See discussion supra Part II (discussing governmental decisions made during Katrina).
212. See supra note 7 (discussing harm suffered during Katrina).
213. Groups of Katrina victims should bring their claims together in a class action lawsuit to
spread the expense among a large group. See Smith, supra note 168, at 732 ("On balance, a Rule
23(b)(3) certified class action appears to be the best vehicle for recovery available to Hurricane
Katrina victims. A class action retains most features of traditional tort litigation, such as the
plaintiffs burden of proving all elements of their claim, but the high cost of litigation can be shared
among members of the class."). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
One or more members of a class may sue ... on behalf of all only if(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class. [Additionally,] the court [must find] that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3). Katrina claimants meet these requirements because (1) they are
massive in number, (2) the facts and law relevant to their claims are similar, and (3) they will be
bringing similar claims. See discussion supra Part I (discussing numerosity of Katrina claimants);
Part II (discussing facts relevant to Katrina litigation); and Part III (discussing law relevant to the
type of claims that will be brought in Katrina litigation). Claims against the United States must be
negligence claim to be successfully brought, the discussion must be
rephrased in the following legal context: did the government breach a duty it
owed to the citizens of New Orleans, thereby causing them to incur
damages?
2 14
The answer to this question lies buried somewhere within a body of law
that remains to be fully developed and defined.21 5 Unlike traditional
governmental negligence, governmental negligence framed within the
context of an event such as Hurricane Katrina is a concept for which there is
little precedent, 21 6 and no definitive legal guidelines to follow. 217  Many
negligence suits have already been filed against the government since
Katrina, but most have yet to be heard in court.218 Many more lawsuits of
the same nature will indefinitely be filed in the near future.21 9 As discussed
below, certain legal standards pertaining to the relevant established law have
yet to be set by courts. 22 0  The ability of the claimants to survive a
brought in federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000) ("[Federal] district courts...
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States .... "). Claims
against the United States arising in Katrina affected areas such as Orleans Parish, Jefferson Parish,
St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish, and St. Tammany Parish must be brought in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, PACER Service Center Homepage, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/psco/cgi-
bin/county.pl (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). On appeal, these claims must be brought in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit Homepage, http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). Claims against the
State of Louisiana or its political subdivisions must be brought in Louisiana state courts. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (2006) ("No suit against the state or a state agency or political subdivision
shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court."). The government will likely
attempt to consolidate litigation so that multiple actions against it can be heard all at once. See Graci
v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 21-22 (5th Cir. 1971) (district court consolidated multiple claims
alleging governmental negligence during Hurricane Betsy at the behest of the United States).
214. See supra Part IIL.A (discussing elements necessary to perfect a negligence cause of action).
215. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing undeveloped standards of duty and breach
relevant to Katrina litigation).
216. A limited amount of precedent does exist pertaining to claims against the Corps for negligent
design of levees, however. See infra note 329 (discussing Graci v. United States). Due to the lack
of binding precedent relevant to the circumstances giving rise to Katrina litigation, unrelated prior
instances of governmental conduct during emergencies must be examined, and legal argument must
be crafted by analogy. See discussion infra part IV.A. 1-2 (discussing arguments to be presented in
Katrina litigation).
217. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing undefined areas of law relevant to Katrina
litigation).
218. See Manard et al., supra note 56, at 31 ("Within days of Hurricane Katrina's
landfall . . . numerous lawsuits were filed seeking tort recovery under several theories of liability.
Suits continue to be filed for claims related to the immediate impact of the hurricane, and potential
new causes of action arise out of the response and ongoing recovery efforts. Suits have been filed in
spite of the destruction or closure of courthouses. Flooded offices, power outages, and displacement
have not prevented advocates from asserting claims, even when forced to resort to hand-written
petitions.").
219. Seeid. at36.
220. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1-2 (discussing undefined areas of the law relevant to Katrina
litigation).
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government's motion to dismiss 221 largely depends on how courts define
these standards.2 2 The purpose of this section is to show that by defining
221. In upcoming Katrina litigation, the government will file motions for judgments on the
pleadings and attempt to have Katrina claims dismissed before their merits are heard. Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a claim may be dismissed due to a lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(I). The government will likely file
12(b)(I) motions challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court hearing Katrina
claims. To overcome a subject matter jurisdictional attack, the FTCA requires plaintiffs to show an
element of discretion in the government's conduct. See supra note 166 and accompanying text
(discussing jurisdiction of claims brought against the government under the FTCA and the
discretionary function exception); see also supra note 213 (discussing which courts Katrina claims
will be brought in). The burden of proof in a 12(b)(1) motion lies with the party asserting the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
2001). Accordingly, Katrina plaintiffs will bear this burden. As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has stated:
When a Rule 12(b)(l) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the
court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack
on the merits. This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely
dismissing a case with prejudice. The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the
plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not
prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have jurisdiction.
Id. (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). Under standard
circumstances, "the district court can resolve factual disputes in determining jurisdiction pursuant to
a Rule 12(b)(l) motion for dismissal." Montez v. Dep't of the Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 148 (5th Cir.
2004). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, a district court is generally free to weigh
evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to determine whether it has power to hear the case.
See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947), overruled on other grounds, Larson v. Domestic &
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Furthermore, "[a] court may base its disposition of
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F.
Supp. 2d 684, 688 (E.D. La. 2007) (quoting Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 117
F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997)). In short, no presumption of truthfulness attaches to a plaintiff's
allegations, and courts can independently resolve disputed issues of material fact in order to
determine subject matter jurisdiction. See id. However, if the dispute is interdependently
determinative of both the jurisdictional question and the merits of the underlying cause of action, a
district court may err by resolving the dispute in favor of the government. See id. When issues of
fact are central both to determining subject matter jurisdiction and the merits of an FTCA claim, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a district court must assume jurisdiction and proceed on the merits. See
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[When] the defendant's challenge to the
court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the proper course
of action for the district court ... is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a
direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case [under Rule 12(b)(6)]."). In Williamson, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that:
[N]o purpose is served by indirectly arguing the merits in the context of federal
jurisdiction. Judicial economy is best promoted when the existence of a federal right is
directly reached and, where no claim is found to exist, the case is dismissed on the merits.
This refusal to treat indirect attacks on the merits as Rule 12(b)(1) motions provides,
moreover, a greater level of protection to the plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to
the validity of his claim: the defendant is forced to proceed under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . or
315
these standards in fair, practical, and logical ways, a cause of action for
Rule 56 ... both of which place greater restrictions on the district court's discretion.
1d.; see also Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1347 (5th Cir. 1985) (supporting
Williamson court's reasoning). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a claim
to be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Additionally,
If, on a motion asserting the [12(b)(6)] defense ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment... and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion.
Id. To overcome challenges to subject matter jurisdiction in upcoming Katrina litigation, claimants
must argue that the resolution of the jurisdictional dispute is significantly intertwined with factual
issues going to the merits of the FTCA claim, and that dismissal pursuant to a 12(b)(l) motion is
therefore improper. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (denying United
States' 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss FTCA claim due to intertwining ofjurisdictional and merit-based
issues); see also infra note 320 and accompanying text (further discussing In re Katrina Canal
Breaches). Other Circuits have also followed the Fifth Circuit's standard by denying governmental
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss FTCA claims. See Green v. Hill, 954 F.2d 694, 698 (1Ith Cir. 1992)
(holding that an FTCA claim against the United States may not be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) based upon the district court's resolution of the disputed
factual question regarding whether an employee of the U.S. Government was acting within the scope
of his employment), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh 'g, 968 F.2d 1098 (11 th Cir. 1992);
Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529-31 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding that the issue of material
fact as to whether a government agent was acting within the scope of his employment when he
attended Christmas parties and afterwards was involved in automobile accident precluded dismissal
of suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1983) ("Because the jurisdictional issue is dependent upon the resolution of factual issues going
to the merits [of the FTCA claim], it was incumbent upon the district court to apply summary
judgment standards in deciding whether to grant or deny the government's motion."). As the
government will likely file both a 12(b)(l) and a 12(b)(6) motion in Katrina litigation, it is
imperative for plaintiffs to persuade a court to dismiss the 12(b)(1) motion and hear the claim under
a 12(b)(6) standard. A 12(b)(6) standard is advantageous to claimants because this standard requires
courts to take all facts alleged in a complaint as true, and to resolve ambiguities in the current
controlling substantive law in plaintiffs' favor. Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001). Because the current controlling
substantive law relevant to upcoming Katrina litigation is littered with ambiguities, it is imperative
for claimants to have unclear law resolved in their favor. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1-2
(discussing legal ambiguities). Additionally, "[a] court may dismiss a complaint [under Rule
12(b)(6)] only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (emphasis
added). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor by courts and are rarely
granted. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2005). Specifically,
claimants should argue that in determining if Secretary Chertoffs actions pursuant to the NRP were
discretionary in nature for FTCA jurisdictional purposes, a merit-based analysis of the facts
regarding whether the government breached its "duty" cannot be avoided. See infra Part IV.B.3
(discussing Chertoff's negligence and the federal government's breach of its duty). Plaintiffs can
make this same argument with regard to President Bush's actions governed by the Stafford Act. See
infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the President's negligence during Katrina). Finally, plaintiffs should
argue that in determining whether the Corps' actions in constructing faulty levees were discretionary
for FTCA jurisdictional purposes, factual issues bearing upon the determination of negligence must
be concurrently analyzed. See infra Part IV.B.I (discussing negligent actions on the part of the
Corps).
222. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1-2 (discussing undefined legal standards).
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governmental negligence pertaining to its preparation and response efforts
during Hurricane Katrina can be conclusively established.
1. Duty
"Americans have never left our destiny to the whims of nature, and we will
not start now.,
2 3
Did the government owe a "duty" to the American people living in New
Orleans during Hurricane Katrina? 224 It would be easy to conclude in the
affirmative and claim that the government, just like any private citizen, had a
duty to conform to a "standard of care established by law" so that its conduct
did not subject the people of New Orleans to an "unreasonable risk of
harm. 2 25  When discussing the government's "duty," however, it may be
more relevant to ask if the government's duty goes beyond that of a normal
individual's, in that not only must its conduct conform to "the standard of
care established by law," but that it must actually exceed it. 226 It is not the
case here that the government struck the people of New Orleans with its car
while it was not paying attention.227 The government did not engage in any
affirmative action that directly caused damages to its citizens; 2 8 it failed to
protect and aid Americans in the face of Mother Nature's actions. 229 With
this in mind, the more pertinent inquiry in this analysis seems to be: Did the
223. Jackson Square Speech, supra note 138.
224. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing "duty" as a required element of
negligence claims).
225. See supra Part III.A (discussing required standard of care in traditional negligence cases). In
traditional negligence cases, government entities are held to the same standard of care required for
the rest of society, and liability is determined in the same way as that of a primary defendant. See
generally Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 743 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Ferguson v. United
States, 712 F. Supp. 775, 785-86 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (government negligently maintained fence); Atl.
Aviation Corp. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 121, 124 (D. Del. 1978) (government jeep struck
aircraft).
226. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (addressing heightened governmental duty).
227. If this were the case, a determination of negligence would be made under traditional
standards. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (Army truck collided with plaintiffs
car); Grier v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.C. 1968) (pedestrian struck by mail truck);
Jones v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (child struck by mail truck).
228. But see infra note 306 and accompanying text (arguing that in designing the MRGO Canal,
the government affirmatively caused harm by increasing risk of danger).
229. See discussion supra Part II (discussing government's failures during Hurricane Katrina).
government owe a duty to protect and aid the people of New Orleans in the
face of harm?230
While most American citizens (and all New Orleanians) would likely
answer this question with an overwhelming "yes," this duty remains to be
conclusively articulated in a legal context.2 3 ' The most powerful argument
in support of the existence of a governmental duty to protect and aid citizens
in the face of harm can be shown by looking at our country's past.
232
Historically, our government has consistently shielded its citizens from
harm's way, and Americans have come to rely on this protection to their
detriment.233  It logically follows that because the government has
historically "assumed" this responsibility, it should be legally obligated to
act in accordance with a duty to protect and aid. 3 By assuming this duty,
230. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (discussing governmental duty to protect and
aid).
231. While some court decisions and legal discussions have acknowledged a governmental duty to
protect and aid, they have neglected to clearly articulate this duty or describe how it can be breached.
See Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968) (declining to articulate a "general
duty of [governmental] protection in the law of tort" [because] "such extension of responsibilities
should be dictated by ... legislative determination"); DeLong v. County of Erie, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887,
892-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that a duty to protect exists under certain circumstances, but
stating only that the duty must be fulfilled in a "nonnegligent" manner); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (stating "[i]f the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage
was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under the [Federal] Tort Claims Act,"
but failing to describe standard appropriate to determine breach) (emphasis added); infra notes 234,
262 (further discussing Delong and Indian Towing Co.); see also Jackson Square Speech, supra note
138 (implying the existence of a governmental duty owed to Katrina victims but failing to articulate
it in any clear manner); Jackson, supra note 28, at 558-71 ("Was a duty owed by the federal
government to the citizens of New Orleans? . . . Did the federal government breach its
duty? ... Who should be responsible for what happened to the citizens of New Orleans? . .. The
answers to these questions will.., bring clarity to what happened immediately following Hurricane
Katrina .... ).
232. See infra notes 238-54 and accompanying text (discussing history of governmental protection
from harm).
233. "Detrimental reliance" is a concept which originated from the common-law notion of
"equitable estoppel." See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 983 (3d ed. 2002).
In essence, the concept of equitable estoppel provides that when a party acts in a certain manner, and
others rely on these actions to their detriment, the party is bound by its previous actions. See United
States v. Ga.-Pac. Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970) (outlining four-part test for estoppel); Cent.
Microfilm Serv. Corp. v. Basic/Four Corp., 688 F.2d 1206, 1218 (8th Cir. 1982) (outlining three-part
test); Plymouth Foam Prods., Inc. v. City of Becker, 120 F.3d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1997) (outlining
one-part test). This concept was subsequently adopted by tort law, and can be used as a basis for
establishing a governmental duty in the case at hand. See infra notes 234-35 (discussing case law
that applies the notion of equitable estoppel to questions of tort liability).
234. With respect to the specific geographic area affected by Hurricane Katrina, an even greater
governmental duty should be accorded. See generally Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d
500, 504 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that a power company owed a duty to prevent flooding from
negligent operation of its dam to downstream landowners). When a government decides to
affirmatively enter a region and build protective physical structures, citizens of that region heavily
rely on these structures for protection. See id. When the federal government chose to assume
responsibility for flood control in the Gulf Coast region, it assumed a heightened duty to protect and
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the government effectively "R.S.V.P.'d but failed to arrive, 235 and as Judge
aid the citizens of New Orleans. See generally supra Part lI.A.1 (discussing the levee system).
Hurricane Betsy taught the citizens of New Orleans how dangerous living in New Orleans could be,
and many of them would have likely relocated to safer regions had the government not constructed
the LPVHPP. See supra note 32 (discussing Hurricane Betsy). Many residents chose to remain
living in New Orleans solely because the Corps built flood control structures to protect the City, and
this reliance caused countless Americans to lose their lives and loved ones. See supra note 7
(discussing lives taken by Katrina). The facts at hand are very similar to those in Kunz v. Utah
Power & Light Co. In Kunz, a power company voluntarily undertook flood control responsibilities
in a region, and then failed to protect the area from floodwaters. 526 F.2d at 501-02. Noting that
landowners had reasonably come to rely on the company's flood control structures, the court held
that "Utah Power must carry the responsibility for avoiding damaging floods," and that defendant
"had a duty of care on which liability for negligent damage can be based." Id. at 504. The court
reasoned:
In general, the law does not require one person to act affirmatively to prevent harm to
another unless he has himself brought about the condition which threatens the harm.
Courts have often found an exception to this rule, however, when one person has
voluntarily undertaken to assist another. He is then required to exercise reasonable care
to protect the other's interests. Thus when a railroad voluntarily provides a flagman at an
intersection, a relationship with motorists is established which creates a duty of care. In
cases in which such liability has been found, the plaintiffs condition usually was
worsened by his reliance on the defendant's action, though such detrimental reliance has
not always been required.
Id. at 503. Similar to the defendant in Kunz, the Corps created a special relationship with the people
of New Orleans when it built the LPVHPP. Courts should therefore hold that the government had a
"duty of care" during Katrina, and that damages resulting from the breach of this duty are
recoverable. Additional case law has supported the "duty by detrimental reliance" argument in the
past. In DeLong, a woman was murdered when police failed to respond to her 911 telephone call.
455 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. The court held that by providing the 911 service, the municipality had
assumed a duty to protect its residents, and that it was therefore legally required to act in accordance
thereof. See id. at 888. The court reasoned that the decision to provide a 911 service caused
residents to detrimentally rely on the municipality's protective services. Id. at 892. It further noted
that because she had called 911, the victim chose to remain inside her house and await rescue from
certain danger, rather than relocating to a safer premises. Id. The court concluded that the
municipality's failure to respond was the proximate cause of the victim's death, and damages should
be awarded. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 28, at 561 ("[The] expectation of the federal
government by its citizens to provide protection and assistance is well grounded on past actions of
the federal government in coming to the aide of its citizens during a time of crisis."); Riss, 240
N.E.2d at 861 (implying the existence of a governmental duty to protect when "authorities undertake
responsibilities to particular members of the public and expose them, without adequate protection, to
the risks which then materialize into actual losses" (citing Schuster v. City of N.Y., 154 N.E.2d 534
(N.Y. 1958))); Pierre v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 306 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding Department of
Housing and Urban Development liable for negligently failing to remove lead paint after it
voluntarily undertook responsibility to repair plaintiff's house). President Bush himself has stated
"[flour years after the frightening experience of September 11 th, Americans have every right to
expect a more effective response in a time of emergency," and "[w]e have a duty to confront this
poverty with bold action." Jackson Square Speech, supra note 138 (emphasis added).
235. Jackson, supra note 28, at 562. If plaintiffs cannot persuade a court that the government had
a legal duty to protect them from Hurricane Katrina, they can fall back on the following alternative
argument: Although the government did not have a duty to act, because it made the decision to
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Cardozo once stated, "[t]he hand once set to a task may not always be
withdrawn with impunity though liability would fail if it had never been
applied at all. 236
Additionally, the preamble to the Constitution of the United States
reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.237
The government has historically acted in compliance with its
constitutional charge to "insure domestic tranquility" and "provide for the
common defense," and it is not unreasonable to derive an implied duty to
protect and aid from this language. 238 From the beginning of our country's
existence, the government has acted in a manner which acknowledges and
respects this obligation.239 State and local governments have historically
recognized the existence of this duty by establishing police departments, fire
departments, emergency medical services, state and county-run hospitals,
and various other institutions designed to protect and aid citizens in the face
of harm. 140 The federal government has also historically accepted this
"gratuitously" act, it was legally obligated to exercise reasonable care in doing so. See Kruchten v.
United States, 914 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990) ("There is, in general, no duty to protect another
from injury or harm which might befall him or her. Nevertheless, in some circumstances one who
gratuitously accepts the responsibility of acting to protect another must utilize due care even though
no duty would exist otherwise."); Isler v. Burman, 232 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Minn. 1975) ("It is well
established that one who voluntarily assumes a duty must exercise reasonable care or he will be
responsible for damages resulting from his failure to do so."); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276
(N.Y. 1922) ("It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all."). Under this argument,
claimants can assert that their damages were caused by the government's careless acts when it
"assumed" a duty to protect by building levees and conducting rescue efforts. See discussion supra
Part I1 (discussing preparation and response efforts).
236. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928); see also Kunz, 526
F.2d at 503 ("The question appears to be essentially one of whether the defendant has gone so far in
what he has actually done, and has gotten himself into such a relationship with the plaintiff, that he
has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely, as distinguished from merely failing to
confer a benefit upon him." (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 340 (4th ed. 1971))).
237. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
238. See Jackson, supra note 28, a 559 (discussing the creation of FEMA and DHS).
239. See infra notes 240-54 and accompanying text (discussing government behavior that
conforms to a duty to protect and aid).
240. See DeLong v. County of Erie, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("[W]hen a
relationship is created between the police and an individual which gives rise to a special duty, the
municipality loses its governmental immunity and liability may result.").
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obligation by establishing the most capable military force in the world to
protect its citizens against threats from abroad and civil unrest.24' By
creating federal agencies such as FEMA, the DHS, and the DOD, the United
States has reiterated its acknowledgement of this duty,242 and Americans
have come to rely on the protection of these agencies.2 43  Furthermore,
because the funds used to create and maintain these agencies are American
tax dollars, 244 citizens should have every right to reasonably expect aid and
protection from them.
In the aftermath of attacks of September 11, 2001, government
authorities reacted by providing aid and assistance to devastated citizens.
2 45
While this tragic event was not one that could have been reasonably
anticipated, the government's reflexive response of providing immediate
medical care is a powerful example of behavior that conforms to the
existence of a "duty to aid. 246 In response to the attacks, the government
also sent troops overseas to Iraq in order to preemptively extinguish any
terrorist cells that may pose a future threat to Americans. 247  This sort of
behavior clearly supports the existence of a governmental "duty to protect"
citizens. 24t
241. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 559. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the
strongest military power in the world. See The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement,
http://www.army.mil/APS/04/commitment.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). The American
military's technological edge and advanced capabilities allowed the Army to downsize its operations
in recent times, while remaining equally as capable. Id.
242. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 558 ("In essence, the establishment of these entities created a
duty to protect and safeguard the citizens of this country.") (emphasis added).
243. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for the creation of
DHS and FEMA); Jackson, supra note 28, at 561 ("The establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security has offered Americans the opportunity to rely on the federal government for
protection and safety. The formation of government entities such as the department of Homeland
Security and FEMA in response to times of crisis has led the people of the United States, including
citizens of New Orleans, to believe that the federal government will provide protection and
assistance.").
244. See WhiteHouse.gov, President Bush Signs Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060926.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2007).
245. See infra note 363 and accompanying text (discussing governmental response to September
II attacks).
246. See infra notes 363-65 and accompanying text (discussing "duty to aid" and federal response
to attacks of September 11).
247. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 559.
248. See id. at 560 ("The federal government's history of protecting the country has placed its
citizens in a position of knowing that their government will take necessary steps to protect them
from harm[']s way. This was most recently addressed following September I l and the present war
in Iraq.").
Every war this nation has ever fought reflects a duty to protect
Americans. 249 Every governmental response to every major fire, earthquake,
flood, or hurricane in this nation's history recognizes a duty to aid on local,
state, and federal levels. 250  When the Corps constructed the levees in New
Orleans, it did so in order to protect citizens. 5' Governmental rescue
operations following Katrina, albeit inadequate, were actions taken in
fulfillment of an obligation to aid citizens. 252  By looking at our country's
history, it is clear that the government has always, and will hopefully always
continue to, act in a manner that requires it to protect and aid its citizens in
the face of danger. 253  By acting in this manner, federal, state, and local
governments have adopted a legal duty to protect and aid citizens in the face
of harm.254
2. Breach
After establishing that the government did in fact have a duty to protect
and aid the people of New Orleans, the next pertinent legal inquiry is to
determine whether the government breached that duty while preparing for
and responding to Katrina.255 It is ludicrous to imagine that there is or
should be some sort of strict liability scheme in place, holding that the
government breached its duty to protect and aid every time a citizen is
harmed or left without assistance.25 6 If this were the case, courtrooms would
249. See id. at 559; see also The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement, supra note 241
("We will protect our country and our way of life as we have for 228 years. It is our privilege, our
duty, and our honor to do so.") (emphasis added).
250. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover's leadership in the government's response to the
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 (Great Flood) earned him a seat in the White House in 1928. See
Manard et al., supra note 56, at 31. The Great Flood displaced more than 700,000 Americans and
engulfed more than 27,000 miles of land. Id.
[T]he Great Flood accelerated a shift away from individual self-reliance in the face of
natural disasters, as more and more people came to believe that government was
responsible for protecting individual citizens. In extreme circumstances where state
resources were inadequate, people would look to the federal government for that
protection. This was a sea change in the public's understanding of an individual's
relationship with government.
Id. (emphasis added).
251. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for building LPVHPP).
252. See discussion supra Part iI.B.1-2 (discussing government's response efforts); Jackson
Square Speech, supra note 138 ("When the federal government fails to meet such an obligation, I as
[P]resident am responsible for the problem, and for the solution.") (emphasis added).
253. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 559 ("Citizens should be able to expect protection of their
welfare during national disasters. This protection of the interest and safety of American citizens has
been the norm during disastrous times.") (internal citations omitted).
254. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (presenting "duty by detrimental reliance"
argument).
255. See discussion supra Part III.A (defining elements needed for a negligence cause of action).
256. See Schuster v. City of N.Y., 154 N.E.2d 534, 537 (N.Y. 1958) ("[Governmental liability] for
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be flooded with frivolous lawsuits brought by plaintiffs alleging that the
DHS failed to assist them when they were injured while hiking in the woods,
or that the sheriffs department failed to protect them from getting rear-
ended on the interstate.257 As the government lacks the ability to be
everywhere at once, citizens cannot expect it to serve as a sort of all
encompassing protector.258
The government can only protect citizens from threats it knows exist,
and can only provide aid to distressed citizens it has knowledge of and is
able to reach. 259 There is also a limitation as to how much aid and protection
our government can afford, as governmental resources are finite.26 °
Additionally, even if these criteria are met, it is only fair to allow the
government to make reasonable mistakes. 26' Government is, at bottom, a
group of fallible human beings just like everyone else. While we hope
experience and training allows government officials to perform their duties
in an effective manner, the reality remains that human beings are not perfect,
and will inevitably make mistakes.
A definitive legal standard for determining exactly when the
government has breached its duty to protect and aid citizens has yet to be
defined, 262 and any proposed standard must take all of these factors into
every loss caused by outlaws or by fire ... bespeaks no obligation enforceable in the courts.");
Kruchten v. United States, 914 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that
strict liability should be imposed upon the government for failing to maintain an embankment,
noting that "[t]here is, in general, no duty to protect another from injury or harm which might befall
him or her" (citing Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979)).
257. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
260. See Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 860 (N.Y. 1968) ("The amount of protection that
may be provided is limited by the resources of the community ... ").
261. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonableness of imposing a strict
liability scheme on the government).
262. See supra note 231 (discussing the lack of an articulated legal standard for determining
breach). In a previous decision, the Supreme Court referenced a required standard of care but failed
to provide any clear guidelines to determine if the standard has been met. Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). In Indian Towing Co., the owner of a barge sued the federal
government for damages due to the Coast Guard's negligent operation of a lighthouse. Id. at 61-62.
The Supreme Court ruled that once the government decides to undertake protective activities, it is
legally obligated to use "due care" in doing so. Id. at 69. As Justice Frankfurter noted:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its
discretion to operate a light[house] ... and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded
by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in
good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was
further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give
warning that it was not functioning.
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consideration.263 Keeping practical limitations in mind, it seems fair to
maintain that the government has a duty to protect and assist when it is
capable of doing sO.264 When the government fails to protect citizens from a
danger of which it was unaware, it cannot be said to have breached its
duty.2 65 Similarly, when the government fails to come to the aid of a citizen
whose distress is unknown, no duty is breached.266 Accordingly, the
government can only have a duty to aid and protect citizens from harm it
sufficiently knows to exist.267 Knowing this, it is clear that the government
has breached its duty if it chooses not to respond to a known threat posed to
its citizens.268
A much more likely and more difficult scenario, however, is when the
government does respond to danger or harm, but the response proves to be
inadequate.269 Is the duty still breached because harm has occurred, or is the
duty fulfilled because the government made an effort to protect and aid?
270
What is the requisite standard of care the government must exercise in these
situations? 271  Two possible standards can be logically set forth.
The first, and more straightforward, standard looks at the standard of
care that the government has exercised in the past when protecting or
coming to the aid of citizens.27 Under this standard, the government is in
breach if the standard of care it exercises while engaged in a protective or
rescue operation falls short of the standard of care it has traditionally
exercised during similar operations in the past.273
Id. (emphasis added). Because the Court left "due care" undefined, a concrete legal standard for
determining whether a governmental duty has been breached has yet to be determined. See Kruchten
v. United States, 914 F.2d 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a governmental duty to protect
landowners against flooding exists under certain circumstances, but failing to discuss the standard
for determining breach).
263. See supra notes 256-61 and accompanying text (discussing limitations which must be taken
into consideration when determining the government's duty of care).
264. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonableness of strict liability
scheme).
266. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 272-81 and accompanying text (discussing proposed standards for
determining breach).
269. See discussion supra Part lI.B. 1-2 (discussing federal response to Hurricane Katrina).
270. See infra notes 272-81 and accompanying text (discussing standards for determining breach).
271. See infra notes 272-81 and accompanying text.
272. See Nicolaus Mills, Herbert Hoover and Hurricane Katrina, DISSENT MAGAZINE, winter
2006, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=152 (last visited Feb. 22, 2006)
(asserting that an analysis of past disasters and the way previous administrations have handled them
is helpful in evaluating the Bush administration's response to Hurricane Katrina).
273. For purposes of this comment, the analysis will be called the "alternative standard." A
discussion of this standard is limited to analyzing the federal government's preparation and response
efforts during Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, and the attacks of September 11, 2001. See infra
notes 361-67 and accompanying text (discussing government's liability under this standard).
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The second standard is directly derived from traditional negligence law,
which requires individuals to act as a "reasonably prudent person" would
have acted under the same or similar circumstances.274 Having already
concluded that the government must at least attempt to aid and protect
citizens who face harm,275 it seems fair to conclude that a government which
fails in this attempt did not breach its duty if it nonetheless acted reasonably
prudent.276 But as tort law has long recognized, professionals are held to a
higher standard than lay people, 277 and government officials are in fact
professionals. When conducting themselves, governmental officials must
not act as the "reasonably prudent person," but rather, as an ordinary
"reasonably prudent government official" would under the same or similar
circumstances. 278 Government officials are trained to remain level-headed
and rational throughout stressful situations so they can exercise proper
judgment during emergencies. 279  Because of their expertise, they must be
274. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 147, at 1061; see supra notes 147-48 and
accompanying text (discussing required standard of care in traditional negligence law).
275. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonably prudent person"
standard).
277. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 168 n.2 ("The standard is expressed in objective
form-the knowledge, training and skill (or ability and competence) of an ordinary member of the
profession in good standing.").
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). The practice of holding
professionals to a higher standard than lay people has been recognized in American courts
throughout history. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 168 n.2 (citations omitted). "The
standard of skill and knowledge required of [a professional] actor who practices a profession or trade
is that which is commonly possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. e (1965). Accordingly, we must weigh actions of
government actors against that of the "prudent government official," rather than the "prudent
layperson." See Wiggins v. Piver, 171 S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. 1970) (quoting Starnes v. Taylor, 158
S.E.2d 339, 343 (N.C. 1968)) (holding that physicians and surgeons "must 'possess the degree of
professional learning, skill and ability which others similarly situated ordinarily possess'); Duffey
Law Office, S.C. v. Tank Transp., Inc., 535 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding an
attorney to a higher standard of care); Edward Brodsky & Richard P. Swanson, The Expanded
Liability of Accountants for Negligence, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 252 (1984) (discussing heightened
standard of care for accountants).
279.FINAL REPORT supra note 32, at 152. Federal, state, and local, government officials in
Alabama participate in various "training exercises each year ranging from . . . classroom-like
discussions to full scale exercises involving all members of the emergency management
community." Id. "[A]lmost all of these exercises involve a terrorism-based threat or
scenario . . . [and] largely involve the same set of procedures - evacuations, loss of power,
communications difficulties, need for shelter, food, and water, and inter-governmental
coordination." Id. (citing Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State ofAlabama,
Hearing Before Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of Bruce Baughman, Dir., Ala. State
Emergency Mgmt. Agency)).
325
held to a higher standard than ordinary citizens.28° Under this standard, a
breach occurs when, in the course of a protective or rescue operation, the
conduct of a government official fails to conform to that of an ordinary
reasonably prudent government official in the same or similar
circumstances, thereby causing the operation to fail or be compromised.28'
Although based on different premises, these two standards will
generally lead to the same results when analyzing Katrina-related claims. 82
In the case at hand, we can find many breaches at various stages at all levels
of government.283 The key breaches that will be the focus of upcoming
litigation are discussed in Subpart B.2M
3. Causation and Damages
There do not seem to be any significant causation issues pertinent to
upcoming Katrina litigation.285 In each scenario, it seems that a plaintiff will
be able to sufficiently establish that "but-for" the government's breach, his
or her damages would have either not occurred or been significantly
mitigated.2 86 No proximate causation issues should surface in upcoming
litigation either.287 Because Hurricane Katrina's severity and likelihood of
hitting New Orleans was sufficiently known well in advance,288 the
government cannot claim that the end result of its negligent conduct was in
any way "unforeseeable. ' ' 289  In upcoming litigation, citizens who were
harmed as a result of Hurricane Katrina will be primarily suing for
compensatory damages.290 Notwithstanding statutory recovery caps,29'
280. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
281. For purposes of this article, this analysis will be called the "traditional standard."
282. See discussion infra Part IV.B (presenting negligence analysis for primary defendants).
283. See discussion supra Part 1I (discussing preparation and response efforts).
284. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
285. See supra note 151 (discussing causation element of negligence).
286. See supra note 151 (discussing "actual cause").
287. See supra note 151 (discussing "proximate cause").
288. See supra notes 84, 100 and accompanying text (discussing NWS warning and PAM
exercise).
289. See supra note 151 (discussing "unforseeability" and proximate causation). Additionally,
plaintiffs must only prove that the government's actions were a substantial factor in bringing about
their harm, not the sole cause, for sufficient proximate causation to be shown. Ferguson v. U.S.
Army, 938 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1991). It is clear that governmental actions with respect to the
levees, evacuation, and response were at least a "substantial factor" in bringing about damages. See
discussion supra Part 11 (discussing governmental preparation and response efforts).
290. Compensatory damages represent the closest possible financial equivalent to the loss or harm
suffered by the plaintiff. These damages are intended to "make the plaintiff whole again," by putting
him back in the position he was in before the occurrence of the tort. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra
note 148, at 519; see also supra notes 7, 11 (discussing damages suffered by Katrina victims).
291. Recovery against the State of Louisiana and its political subdivisions is limited by statute.
Manard, supra note 56, at 35. These subdivisions include municipalities, parishes, levee districts,
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plaintiffs will be claiming damages for injuries that they personally suffered,
the deaths of their loved ones,2 92 and damage caused to their property.293
B. Primary Defendants 294
Valid arguments alleging negligent conduct on the part of federal, state,
and local governmental entities exist to be made in upcoming litigation.295
and the New Orleans Sewer and Water Board. Id. The statutory cap limits recovery to $500,000 on
personal injury and wrongful death judgments, applying to each person suffering an injury, or each
decedent in a wrongful death case. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (2006)). This cap
does not apply to property damage claims. Id. Public assets are not subject to seizure, and
judgments against political subdivisions must be satisfied by funds appropriated by the subdivisions.
Id. The recovery of punitive damages and pre-judgment interest from the federal government is
restricted by statute: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating
to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (emphasis added).
292. All fifty states have a statutory cause of action that allows plaintiffs to recover for the
wrongful death of their loved ones. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 148, at 570; see also STUART
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY (3d ed. 1992) (discussing wrongful death
statutes of the individual states).
293. See supra note II (discussing property damage caused by Katrina).
294. It is important to note that the actual recovery of damages will likely be another hurdle for
plaintiffs who bring claims against the State of Louisiana, Louisiana's political subdivisions, or the
City of New Orleans. See Manard, supra note 56, at 35. Before judgments against the State of
Louisiana or its subdivisions can be paid, the state legislature must appropriate the necessary funds.
See Louisiana House of Representatives Homepage, http://house.louisiana.gov/slg04/
SLGCh2_PI.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). The City of New Orleans does not have sufficient
funding to even conduct its own operations, and it has recently laid off a significant amount of city
employees. See Manard, supra note 56, at 35. Without direct assistance from the Unites States, it is
unlikely that the city would be able to appropriate funds sufficient to satisfy judgments against it. Id.
The Orleans Levee District, the political subdivision of the State that was responsible for the
maintenance of Orleans Parish's levees, is reportedly insured for $10 million. Id. Without direct
action by the state legislature, recovery beyond that amount will be impossible. Id. The State of
Louisiana is also limited financially, and the appropriation of funds to satisfy large judgments may
prove to be unfeasible. See id. Historically, judgments against the United States have required
specific congressional appropriations for payment. See 31 U.S.C. § 724(a) (1954). In 1956,
Congress enacted a permanent, indefinite appropriation for the payment of final judgments known as
the "Judgment Fund." See 2 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS:
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 16.12 (1993) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1992)).
Because "FTCA judgments are [now] payable out of a permanent, indefinite appropriation,"
judgments against the United States are paid quite promptly. Id. While this makes the federal
government and its agencies the primary targets for litigation, it is still important for plaintiffs to
name state and local entities in their suits, so that empty chairs are not left in the courtroom for the
federal government to point to during trial.
295. See infra notes 301-92 and accompanying text (presenting arguments for governmental
negligence).
When examining the Katrina timeline from beginning to end, numerous
"breaches of duties" can be found.2 96  From the early planning and
prevention stages, all the way up to the post-landfall rescue operations,
instances of federal, state, and local governmental negligence become
immediately apparent.297 In addition to listing the primary defendants and
their potential immunities, 298 this subsection suggests how courts should
interpret the existing legal framework, so that fair and logical outcomes can
come about.299 Table 2 lists the primary defendants who will be named in
upcoming Katrina litigation, as well as the major hurdles plaintiffs must
overcome with respect to each entity.
300
296. See generally discussion supra Part 11 (discussing governmental preparation and response
efforts).
297. See generally discussion supra Part II.
298. See infra notes 301-92 and accompanying text (discussing primary defendants and their
potential defenses).
299. See infra notes 301-92 and accompanying text (suggesting how courts should interpret the
existing legal framework). The "act of God" defense should be easily overcome in all Katrina-
related claims, and is thus only discussed in this footnote. See discussion supra Part III.C
(discussing the "act of God" defense). This defense is limited to cover events that are truly
unforeseeable, and does not apply to events that have occurred before in the region. See Jackson,
supra note 28, at 566 (citing Fairbury Brick Co. v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb.
1907)); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 80 ("That's probably the most painful thing about
Katrina, and the tragic loss of life: the foreseeability of it all." (quoting Hurricane Katrina:
Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Hearing Before Select Bipartisan Comm. to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005)
(statement of Chairman Tom Davis))). If an event such as a flood or storm has happened in a region
before, there exists "a presumption that the event may occur again." Jackson, supra note 28, at 566
(citing Binder, supra note 200, at 14-15). Furthermore, flood damage caused by faulty design,
structure, construction, or maintenance is likely not covered by this defense. See id. at 567; see also
Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 (E.D. La. 2002) (holding that hurricanes
striking hurricane-prone areas during hurricane season cannot be considered "unanticipated");
Kimble v. Mackintosh Hemphill Co., 59 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. 1948) ("One who fails in his duty to
remedy a defective or dangerous condition is liable for injuries resulting therefrom, although the
immediate cause of the injury is [the 'act of God']."). Finally, if the harm resulted from both
defendants and "God's" actions, the defendant is still liable. Binder, supra note 200, at 17-18. New
Orleans is located in an area that is prone to hurricanes, and the severity of damage a Category 4
storm would entail was well known to the government. See supra notes 84, 100 and accompanying
text. The fact that the Corps built the levees in the first place is a testament to the foreseeability of
an event such as Katrina. This defense should not be allowed to be asserted on behalf of federal,
state, or local entities for their actions, as Katrina was in no way "unforeseeable."
300. See Appendix, infra Table 2.
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1. The Levees 301
a. Federal Negligence
The Corps designed and constructed the levees and canals in New
Orleans in ways that proved to be largely inadequate. °2 The levees were
only designed to withstand a Category 3 hurricane, when the likelihood of a
much stronger hurricane hitting New Orleans was well known.30 3 Many of
the floodwalls were constructed poorly, 3°4 and many were not properly
grounded into the underlying soil. 305 The MRGO canal was designed in a
way that actually caused Katrina's surge to intensify and drastically
increased the amount of damage the city sustained.30 6 Had the levees and
canals been properly designed and constructed, the levees would not have
breached or been overtopped, and a significant number of people would not
have lost their lives and property.30 7 The Corps knew that a catastrophic
hurricane would cause an unprecedented level of destruction in New
301Orleans, yet it designed and constructed levees which it knew would not
withstand a storm such as Katrina. 30 9 A strong argument can be made that
when designing and building the levees in fulfillment of its duty to protect,
the Corps's conduct did not conform to that of "reasonably prudent"
engineers, and citizens suffered unprecedented damages as a result.
3 10
301. Because the federal government had never built a protective levee system of this scale prior
to the LPVHPP, the "alternative standard" is non-applicable. See Kysar & McGarity, supra note 3 1,
at 185.
302. See discussion supra Part lI.A.1 (discussing inadequate design and construction of levees and
canals).
303. See discussion supra Part II.A.I.
304. See discussion supra Part II.A.I.
305. See discussion supra Part II.A.I.
306. See discussion supra Part II.A.I. Additionally, case law has suggested that liability exists
when governmental conduct "in some way increased the risk" the public was exposed to. See
DeLong v. County of Erie, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (citing Zibbon v. Town of
Cheektowaga, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)). Plaintiffs should argue that because
the MRGO Canal increased the risk of hurricane damage, liability should attach. See supra notes
68-73 and accompanying text (discussing MRGO canal); see also Rodrigue v. United States, 968
F.2d 1430, 1434 (1st Cir. 1992) (imposing liability on government for "negligently making matters
worse").
307. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing inadequate design and construction of levees and
canals).
308. See discussion supra Part II.A. I (discussing the reasons for building LPVHPP).
309. See discussion infra Part IV.A. I (discussing governmental duty to protect).
3 10. See generally supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing "traditional standard").
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In addition to proving the necessary elements for a negligence cause of
action, claimants must also overcome the sovereign immunity hurdle. 31" By
examining the text of the FTCA, we can see that the discretionary function
exception applies to an "act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care."312 It can hardly be said that the Corps engineers were
exercising "due care" when they chose to design levees that they knew
would be too weak to adequately protect New Orleans, and inadequately
grounded the floodwalls. 313 At a bare minimum, a court should recognize
that designing the MRGO Canal to be a deadly "funnel" cannot be
considered "due care. 3 14 If a court strictly interprets this statute's natural
language, sovereign immunity will not apply in these cases.31 5
Nonetheless, plaintiffs will likely have to show that their claim passes
the "Berkovitz test," which exempts the government from liability for actions
that involve an "element of judgment or choice" 31 6 that are "based on
considerations of public policy. '317  While the Corps' actions in planning
and building the levees and canals probably involved elements of "judgment
or choice," courts should not consider judgment calls that lead to the
improper grounding of floodwalls as "based on public policy
considerations., 3 8  As for the dangerous design of the MRGO Canal, the
decision to build the canal in the first place was likely based on public policy
considerations, as the ability for ships to pass through New Orleans is
important for the City's economy.319 Courts should hold that the judgment
exercised in designing it to be a dangerous funnel, however, did not involve
any public policy considerations.320
311. See discussion supra Part 1II.B (discussing sovereign immunity).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
313. See generally discussion supra Part II.A. I (discussing negligent design and construction of
levees).
314. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing MRGO Canal).
315. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (discussing language of statute).
316. Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 531 (1988).
317. Id. at 537.
318. In the past, the Supreme Court has held the federal government liable under the FTCA for
negligence when damages were caused by failed governmental safety mechanisms. See Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 62 (1955) (holding government liable for negligent
operation and maintenance of lighthouse). The Court reasoned that while the initial decision to
undertake the lighthouse service was a discretionary judgment, the failure to maintain the lighthouse
in good working order did not involve any permissible exercise of policy judgment, and the
discretionary function did not shield the government from liability. See id. at 69.
319. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing MRGO Canal).
320. A landmark decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana has recently come out in support of this argument. In In re Katrina Canal Breaches, six
New Orleans residents brought a negligence cause of action against the Corps and the United States
pursuant to the FTCA. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 686 (E.D.
La. 2007). Plaintiffs argued that their damages were caused by the negligent design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of the MRGO Canal specifically. Id. In denying the government's
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The biggest hurdle in claims against the Corps will be the Flood Control
Act.32' Under the "traditional" interpretation of this statute, the federal
government is immune from liability for damages caused by "all waters
contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes
of or related to flood control. 322 The federal government is likely immune
under this interpretation, as the levees during Katrina were sufficiently
"connected to" the LPVHPP federal flood control project.3 23  Under the
Supreme Court's modified interpretation of the Flood Control Act in Central
Green Co., however, courts are now required to consider the "character of
the waters," rather than considering whether a sufficient nexus exists.
32 4
In the case at hand, water that entered the City directly from Lake
Borgne, Lake Pontchartrain, and the Gulf of Mexico when the levees failed
will likely be characterized by courts as "floodwaters," regardless of the
standard used.3 25 It has been held in the past, however, that water used for
commercial purposes is not "floodwater" under the Flood Control Act.32 6
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Judge Duval reasoned:
[P]laintiffs' allegations concerning . . . the numerosity of the decisions made in
constructing and maintaining the MRGO and the inability on this record to characterize
such decisions as being grounded in policy; [as well as] the issue of whether there were
non-policy based decisions made that failed to comport with standard engineering
practices; raises issues that are inextricably tied to the gravamen of the plaintiffs' cause of
action and are not subject to Rule 12(b)(l) treatment.
Id. at 705 (emphasis added); see also supra note 221 (discussing methods of overcoming 12(b)(1)
motions to dismiss FTCA claims). This case is currently set for trial pending further discovery. See
In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
321. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Flood Control Act).
322. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 (1986); see also Boudreau v. United States, 53
F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995) (immunizing federal government from liability when boat owner was
injured during Coast Guard's attempt to tow his boat on a flood control lake); Mocklin v. Orleans
Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 428 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding Corps was immune from liability under the
Flood Control Act for drowning which occurred in flotation channel, dredged as part of flood control
project).
323. See supra notes 37-48, 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing the LPVHPP and MRGO
Canal).
324. See Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001); see also supra note 194 and
accompanying text (discussing standard set forth in Central Green Co.).
325. Even when considering the "character" of these waters under the Central Green Co.
standard, there are no facts indicating that the waters were anything but "floodwaters." See infra
notes 327-33 and accompanying text (presenting arguments as to when water is not "floodwater"
under the Flood Control Act).
326. In Henderson v. United States, a fisherman sued the Corps for negligence when he was
injured by the release of water from a hydroelectric dam. 965 F.2d 1488, 1490 (8th Cir. 1992). The
Eighth Circuit held that water used for the commercial purpose of generating electricity is not
"floodwater" for the purpose of determining immunity under the Flood Control Act. Id. at 1492.
An argument can be made that when the levees along the MRGO shipping
canal breached from the storm surge, much of the water that spilled from
this canal was "commercial water. 327 Plaintiffs could argue that in enacting
the Flood Control Act, Congress did not intend to create immunity from
damages caused by this type of water. 328 They should note that the MRGO
Canal served no flood control purposes, 329 and was primarily used for
commercial transportation.33 ° If the affected residents of the Ninth Ward,
New Orleans East, and St. Bernard Parish can conclusively show that their
damages were caused by waters from this commercial canal,331 and prove
327. See generally supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing MRGO Canal).
328. The facts of the situation at hand are very similar to those presented in Central Green Co.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing Central Green Co.). In both cases, the faulty
segments of the flood control projects which allowed water to flood were largely unrelated to flood
control. In order to follow precedent set by the Supreme Court in Central Green Co., courts should
not classify water that spilled from the MRGO Canal during Hurricane Katrina as "floodwater"
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. At a bare minimum, courts should hold the Corps liable for
damages directly resulting from the negligent design of the MRGO Canal, and the faulty
construction of the levees which line it. See supra notes 68-73 (describing the MRGO Canal). The
government will likely present a counterargument by attempting to distinguish the case at hand from
the facts of Central Green Co. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing Central
Green Co.). For example, in Central Green Co., the damage was caused by small releases of water
over an extended period of time, and the plaintiff failed to allege that any physical failure of the dam
caused any of the property damage. See Central Green Co., 531 U.S. at 427. Katrina damages, on
the other hand, were caused all at once when a storm surge overwhelmed various protective levees.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Claimants should respond to this argument by reminding
the court that it must only "consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage"
when determining if immunity exists. Central Green Co., 531 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). The
"character" of the MRGO Canal waters and the waters released in Central Green Co. can similarly
be placed in the same category-unrelated to flood control. It is useful to distinguish between cases
where claims were not barred by the Flood Control Act and cases where immunity was properly
attached. Compare Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that Corps'
negligent decision to use dynamite to break up an "ice-jam" in an attempt to prevent flooding was
"wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood
control, or any act undertaken pursuant to any such authorization"), and Valley Cattle Co. v. United
States, 258 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D. Haw. 1966) (allowing recovery against the United States for damages
caused by negligent maintenance of a stream because funding was not appropriated by Congress for
flood control purposes), with Parks v. United States, 370 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming the
dismissal of a claim alleging negligent construction, maintenance, and operation of a federal flood
control project pursuant to the Flood Control Act).
329. See Graci v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 947, 956 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding that the MRGO
Canal is "totally unrelated to any natural waterway or the national flood control program"), aff'd and
remanded, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971).
330. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing MRGO Canal). In the case at
hand, claimants should cite Henderson and argue that they too were harmed by a defective segment
of a flood control project that was being used for commercial purposes. See supra note 326 and
accompanying text (discussing Henderson). If courts follow the precedent set forth by the
Henderson court, the government should remain liable for damages caused by MRGO Canal waters,
and the Flood Control Act should not apply.
331. An additional issue that Katrina plaintiffs must overcome at trial will be the difficulty of
proving that their damages were caused by MRGO waters and not other waters. Proving that
damages were caused by one body of water and not by another will require a significant amount of
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that the MRGO Canal was completely unrelated to flood control, 332 a court
should not allow claims to be barred by the Flood Control Act.
3 33
scientific analysis, especially in areas that could have been reached by multiple bodies of water.
332. The Fifth Circuit has supported this assertion in a past decision. In Graci v. United States,
plaintiff sued for property damages caused by floodwaters during Hurricane Betsy. 456 F.2d 20, 22
(5th Cir. 1971). The plaintiff alleged that the floodwaters were allowed to enter his land due to the
negligent construction of the MRGO Canal. Id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing Hurricane Betsy). In affirming the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit found that
because the MRGO "was not a flood control project ... [§ 702c] did not bar suits against the United
States for floodwater damage resulting from the Government's negligence unconnected with flood
control projects." Graci, 456 F.2d at 22. The Fifth Circuit was posed with the same legal question
as courts in upcoming Katrina litigation will be forced to address: "[Is] it ... reasonable to suppose
that in exchange for its entry into flood control projects the United States [should be granted]
complete immunity from liability for the negligent and wrongful acts of its employees unconnected
with flood control projects[?]" Id. at 26. The Graci court answered this question in the negative,
and it is reasonable to expect courts hearing Katrina claims to follow suit. Id. However, a fair
counterargument exists to this assertion. The government may argue that circumstances of the
LPVHPP have dramatically changed since the time of Graci, and that the MRGO is no longer
"totally unrelated to any natural waterway or the national flood control program." Graci, 301 F.
Supp. at 956. Katrina claimants must be prepared to argue that the function of the MRGO canal has
not been significantly altered in the last thirty years.
333. In the recent decision of In re Katrina Canal Breaches., the district court supported this
argument. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695 (E.D. La. 2007);
see supra note 320 (discussing the facts of In re Katrina Canal Breaches). In its ruling, the court
denied the United States' motion to dismiss negligence claims concerning the MRGO Canal based
on immunity provided by the Flood Control Act. In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 471 F. Supp. 2d at
705-06. In denying the government's motion, Judge Duval stated:
The Government is asking this Court to ignore plaintiffs' pleadings, use Rule 12(b)(1) to
rewrite plaintiffs' complaint, find that all of the projects, levees and activities in that area
are flood control projects, and as a result, because ... flood waters caused the damage
alleged, . . . find the Government immune as a matter of law. There is intense
disagreement as to the scope of the "levees" that were created in the dredging of the
MRGO-are these spoilbanks or actual flood control projects? Likewise, there are serious
questions as to the relationship between the MRGO and the L[P]V[HP]P . . . [and] a
complete understanding of the evolution of the MRGO ... is required before any legal
determination can be made. As such ... this Court will not dismiss this suit based on
[the Flood Control Act].
Id. at 695. At the present moment, "it is not clear that as a matter of law, should plaintiffs prove
their allegations as to damages caused by MRGO and not the failure of the flood control projects,
that § 702c will prevent a recovery for the damages caused by MRGO." Id. (emphasis omitted).
Judge Duval allowed the suit to continue because it was not clear if the MRGO canal was a "flood
control project" or a "navigable waterway," and immunity depended on proof of the former. See id.
The determination of this issue is currently pending further discovery, and this case is set to go to
trial in the near future. Id. at 695-96.
b. Local Negligence
Without the benefit of sovereign immunity or the Flood Control Act,
local entities have fewer defenses at their disposal.3 34 Local levee districts
and the New Orleans Sewer and Water board, both parish-run political
subdivisions of the State of Louisiana, were responsible for the inspection
and maintenance of the levees and pumping stations.13  The levees were
improperly maintained, as trees were allowed to grow at the base of the
floodwalls and holes were left unpatched.336 Had the levees been properly
maintained, certain breaches would have either not occurred, or been much
less severe. 337  Additionally, pump operators were ordered to leave their
posts prior to the storm, allowing many canals to overflow. 3 '8 These state
subdivisions did not conform to the legally required standard of care when
fulfilling their duty, and residents lost their lives and property as a result.3 39
The only major hurdle in suits against local bodies will be the actual
recovery of damages.3 40 If plaintiffs can prove negligence on behalf of any
of these political subdivisions, recovery beyond the amount of its liability
insurance will be difficult.341 There is nothing in Louisiana law that requires
the State to pay judgments against the levee districts,342 and the state
legislature is unlikely to appropriate funds for this purpose.343 Although not
completely free from complications, valid arguments exist for claimants to
use in bringing suit against the government for the negligent design,
construction, and maintenance of the levees.
334. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing waiver of local sovereign
immunity).
335. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 87.
336. Id. at 92.
337. Id. at 92-93.
338. Id. at 94.
339. See supra Part ilI.A (discussing standard of care under negligence claims).
340. See Manard, supra note 56, at 35.
341. The Orleans Levee District reportedly has $10 million in liability insurance. Id.
342. Haspel & Davis Milling and Planting Co. v. Bd. of Levee Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee
Dist., No. 06-3829, 2007 WL 29063, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2007), rev'd, 493 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.
2007).
343. See Manard, supra note 56, at 35.




When analyzing the evacuation efforts, instances of negligence at both
state and local levels can be seen. With local and state sovereign immunity
abolished, recovery of damages seems to once again be the major hurdle to
recovery. 345  Both Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco had sufficient
information to understand the magnitude of destruction that Katrina was sure
to bring fifty-six hours prior to arrival, but decided not to order a mandatory
evacuation until only nineteen hours before landfall.3 46 Had a mandatory
evacuation been ordered earlier, many of those who were left behind would
have had a chance to find a way to evacuate the city, and many lives could
have been spared.
3 47
Furthermore, once a mandatory evacuation was finally issued, it was
unenforced.3 4' Although they had the authority to use "reasonable force"
and commandeer resources to enforce a complete evacuation, Nagin and
Blanco chose to use the Superdome as a temporary shelter.3 49  Had the
mandatory evacuation been better enforced, more residents would have been
moved out of harm's way, and countless lives would have been saved.350 In
the fulfillment of their duty to protect citizens, Nagin and Blanco did not
adhere to the clear guidelines they were required to follow in the event of an
emergency. 351 It cannot be said that Nagin and Blanco's poor decision-
making conformed to that of ordinary reasonably prudent government
344. A negligence cause of action may potentially exist against the federal government for its
actions during pre-landfall evacuation efforts as well. See infra Part IV.B.3.
345. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of sovereign
immunity for tort claims against state and local government in Louisiana); see also Manard, supra
note 56, at 35 (describing difficulty of recovering damages from local and state government).
346. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing governmental evacuation efforts).
347. See supra Part II.A.2.
348. See supra Part II.A.2.
349. See supra Part II.A.2.
350. See supra Part II.A.2.
351. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing responsibilities of Mayor under the
New Orleans Plan and responsibilities of Governor under the Louisiana Homeland Security Act).
Recovery from the State under the Louisiana Homeland Security Act will be difficult, as this statute
provides immunity to state agents "while complying with or attempting to comply with this
Chapter," except in the case of "willful misconduct." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:735 (2006). To
recover, plaintiffs will either have to argue that Blanco's conduct was not even an "attempt" to
comply with the statute, or that her actions constituted "willful misconduct." Id.
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officials.35 While valid arguments to establish negligence during
evacuation can be shown, statutory restrictions and a lack of state and local
resources seem to leave suits against the federal government as the most
realistic chance of recovery."'
3. Aid and Rescue-Federal Negligence
As discussed above, federal response efforts were filled with instances
of misjudgment and ineptitude.35 4  Secretary Chertoff had sufficient
knowledge to declare Katrina an INS two days before Katrina hit, yet he
decided to wait until after landfall to make the declaration. 55  Had this
mistake not occurred, the federal government could have provided assistance
to state and local authorities so that a complete pre-landfall evacuation could
have been executed.35 6 At a bare minimum, the federal government could
have provided assistance in time for an effective post-landfall rescue and aid
operation.357 Chertoff's poor judgment caused federal assistance to arrive
after it was too late for countless residents.358 In the fulfillment of the
government's duty, Chertoffs conduct did not arise to the level of a
reasonably prudent cabinet-level official, 35 9 and countless lives were lost as
a result.360
A breach of the federal government's duty can be shown under the
"alternative standard" as well.3 6' Under this standard the relevant inquiry is
whether the federal government's conduct during Katrina arose to its level of
conduct during similar emergencies.3 62  By comparing the government's
decisively urgent response on September 11363 to its painfully slow and
352. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing "traditional standard").
353. See supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
354. See discussion supra Part II.B. I (discussing governmental aid and rescue efforts).
355. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
356. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
357. See discussion supra Part II.B.I.
358. See discussion supra Part lI.B. 1.
359. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing "traditional standard").
360. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing lives lost while awaiting rescue).
361. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing "alternative standard").
362. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
363. The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 10.1: Immediate Responses at Home, at 314,
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/91IReport.pdf. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon, the federal government immediately deployed agencies
including FEMA, a National Medical Response Team, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Id. At 9:55 a.m., the incident commander ordered an
evacuation of the Pentagon impact area due to the potential of a structural collapse, and the
evacuation was completed by 9:57. Id. at 315. It is clear that the government's inadequate response
to Katrina did not conform to the standard of care established during the September II rescue
efforts.
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inadequate response in the case at hand,3&4 we can see that the DHS's
conduct came woefully short of the required standard of care. 365 A breach
can also be shown by comparing the government's preparation for Katrina to
its efforts in anticipation of Hurricane Rita.366 Under either analysis, it can
be shown that the federal government breached its duty during Hurricane
Katrina, and an unprecedented amount of lives were lost as a result.
367
In bringing claims against the United States, plaintiffs must also
consider the Flood Control Act. 36 8  This statute should not apply to the
majority of suits brought against the federal government for negligence
during its response to Katrina.3 69 The majority of these injuries were not
caused by "floodwaters," but by a lack of food, water, medical treatment,
and security in the days following the storm.3 70  This leaves sovereign
immunity as the final and most obvious hurdle in these claims, 37' and
immunity turns on whether Chertoffs hesitation to declare an INS3 72 falls
within the discretionary function exception.3 73 The text of the NRP reads
"'[u]pon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g. involving
mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of DHS
immediately designates the event an INS and begins.., implementation of
the NRP-CIA.' ', 374 While the language "immediately designates" seems
364. See discussion supra Part lI.B. 1 (discussing governmental response efforts).
365. See supra notes 273, 281 and accompanying text (discussing standards for determining
breach).
366. See supra note 126 (discussing preparation for Hurricane Rita). In anticipation of Hurricane
Rita, Chertoff declared an INS at the moment sufficient information was known. See FINAL REPORT
supra note 32, at 12. Because of this decision, evacuation efforts were far more successful than
those during Katrina. Id. at 12-13. Significantly more supplies were stockpiled prior to landfall, and
10,000 National Guardsmen were able to immediately respond. Id. Even though Rita made landfall
as a Category 3 hurricane, only 120 fatalities ensued. See Appendix, infra Table I. By comparing
the government's preparation for Katrina to its efforts in anticipation of Hurricane Rita, it becomes
clear that the DHS's conduct fell extraordinarily short of the required standard of care in the case at
hand.
367. See discussion supra Part ll.B.1 (discussing governmental response efforts).
368. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flood Control Act).
369. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (discussing Flood Control Act).
370. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing lives lost while awaiting rescue).
371. See discussion supra Part lll.B (discussing sovereign immunity).
372. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing Chertoff's hesitation to declare
INS).
373. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary function exception).
374. FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 137 (emphasis added) (quoting Dep't of Homeland
Security, National Response Plan, at CAT-4 (Dec. 2004)).
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mandatory in nature, there seems to be an element of discretion involved in
"recognizing" an event as catastrophic.375
In arguing that Chertoff's conduct did not fall within the discretionary
function exception, plaintiffs should first cite Berkovitz.37 6  As Justice
Marshall noted, the discretionary function exception cannot apply if a
relevant federal statute, policy, or regulation outlines a specific course of
action for the employee to follow. 377  Courts should hold that the NRP is a
policy that outlines a specific course of action for the Secretary to follow,
and that Chertoff s conduct was, thus, not discretionary in nature.378 If the
court holds that it was within Chertoff's discretion whether or not to
recognize Katrina as an INS at an early stage, plaintiffs should respond by
arguing that this judgment was not based on "considerations of public
policy. 3 79 An alternative argument could be that the Secretary's decision
entailed such a gross abuse of discretion that the court should make an
exception and allow liability to attach.38 ° Judges should be receptive to
these arguments if claimants can adequately convey to them the magnitude
of damage caused by Chertoff s misjudgment.381
In addition to the DHS, the White House will also be a potential target
for upcoming litigation.382 The President, under the Stafford Act, had the
authority to bypass the DHS and direct federal agencies to immediately
respond.383 A recent district court decision has characterized the President's
duties under the Stafford Act as discretionary in nature, and thus falling
under the discretionary function exception. 384 While the language of the
375. See supra notes 355-58 (discussing Secretary Chertoffs failure to declare an INS until two
days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall; see also infra notes 376-79 (describing plaintiffs'
possible discretionary function argument).
376. Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
377. Id. at 536 ("[T]hus, the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute,
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this
event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee's
conduct cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the
conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect.").
378. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and functions of the NRP).
379. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537; see generally supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text
(discussing discretionary function exception).
380. See supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text (discussing Chertoff's decision and its
implications).
381. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text (discussing damage caused by Chertoff's
misjudgment).
382. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing White House's role in federal response).
383. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing presidential responsibilities under
Stafford Act).
384. See Armstead v. Nagin, No. 05-6438, 2006 WL 3861769, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2006).
In Armstead, a New Orleans resident brought suit against FEMA, President Bush, Governor Blanco,
and the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District. Id. at *1. Plaintiff alleged
constitutional violations of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause against the
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Stafford Act that states "[i]n any major disaster, the President may direct any
Federal agency ' 385 is without a doubt discretionary in nature, a subsequent
amendment to the Act uses language that is more mandatory in nature.386
Section 5180 provides that: "[t]he President is authorized and directed to
assure that adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available
for emergency mass feeding or distribution in any area of the United States
which suffers a major disaster or emergency. ' 387 Many stranded residents
never received any food during the federal response, and food was never
even ordered for some shelters.388 Plaintiffs in future litigation should cite
section 5180 and argue that the Stafford Act does not afford the President
"judgment or choice"38 9 in deciding whether or not to provide food to
stranded victims.
390
Although it remains unclear how courts will rule in upcoming and
pending Katrina litigation, it is imperative that Katrina victims remain
government entities for failing to provide timely assistance during Hurricane Katrina. Id. at *2.
Plaintiff additionally alleged that President Bush failed in his duties under the Stafford Act. Id. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the claims, and held that
plaintiff had failed to identify "any mandatory duties that President Bush and/or FEMA failed to
take," as "[t]he relevant duties of the President under the Stafford Act . . . are couched in
discretionary language." Id. at *6. The court relied on Ornellas v. United States, which states
"[Iliability should not be imposed on the federal government for discretionary acts or omissions of
its agencies or employees in distributing benefits under ... gratuitous programs." 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 380
(Cl. Ct. 1983) (citing D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505, 507 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
While Armstead dealt with the alleged deprivation of entitlements due under the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses and, therefore, may not be binding on Katrina-related negligence claims
brought under the FTCA, the government may still cite it to show that the President's duties under
the Stafford Act were discretionary in nature, and thereby immune from judicial review. See supra
notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing presidential duties under Stafford Act). Claimants
should respond to this argument by stating that although the President's decision of whether to
respond at all was discretionary, once he decided to intervene, he had the obligation to act in a non-
negligent manner. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) ("[I]t is
hombook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance
must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner."); DeLong v. County of Erie, 455
N.Y.S.2d 887, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("This voluntary assumption of a duty to act carried with
it the obligation to act with reasonable care." (citing Schuster v. City of N.Y., 154 N.E.2d 534, 538
(N.Y. 1958) (McNally, J., concurring))).
385. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(I) (2000) (emphasis added).
386. See Smith, supra note 168, at 717 ("Unlike many portions of the Stafford Act, the statutory
language of § 5180 is mandatory in nature.").
387. 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a) (2000) (emphasis added). This section additionally provides, "The
Secretary of Agriculture shall utilize funds appropriated under section 612c of title 7, to purchase
food commodities necessary to provide adequate supplies for use in any area of the United States in
the event of a major disaster or emergency in such area." Id. § 5180(b) (emphasis added).
388. See Lipton, White House, supra note I 1l, at Al.
389. Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 531 (1988).
390. See42 U.S.C. § 5180(a).
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vigilant in bringing their claims. The massive scope of damages,3 91 coupled
with widespread dissatisfaction,392 should be sufficient to fuel litigation for a
long period of time. For the time being, plaintiffs must continue to bring
their claims and hope that the sheer volume of litigation persuades courts to
interpret the law in fair and logical ways.
V. IMPACT
A. Why Should We Sue Ourselves?
While arguments can be made to bypass sovereign immunity for Katrina
claims brought against all levels of government, the elephant in every
American taxpayer's living room remains to be addressed. A good starting
point for this discussion is a review of the justification for sovereign
immunity in the first place. In essence, sovereign immunity exists to protect
the Federal Treasury from damage judgments.393 In Alden v. Maine, Justice
Kennedy expressly addressed this justification:
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the
prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the
disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens
to levy on its treasury or perhaps even government buildings or
property which the State administers on the public's behalf.
3 94
This justification necessarily leads us to conclude that sovereign
immunity is needed to protect taxpayers. American taxpayers will likely
ask: "Why should I have to pay for negligent acts that I in no way
contributed to, that occurred hundreds of miles away from my home?" If
legislatures appropriate funds to pay judgments to Katrina victims, taxpayers
will eventually bear the brunt of these payouts, as tax dollars will ultimately
be the funds used to settle these claims. 395  The underlying assumption
rooted in the justification for sovereign immunity is that it is better to allow
citizens to be injured at the government's hands, than to spread the injury
391. See supra notes 7, 11 (discussing scope of Katrina's damages).
392. See supra note 7 (discussing dissatisfaction regarding governmental preparation and
response).
393. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201, 1216-17
(2001) (citing Noel P. Fox, The King Must Do No Wrong: A Critique of the Current Status of
Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 177, 187 (1979); Clark Byse, Proposed
Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479, 1526 (1962)).
394. 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999).
395. See Chemerinsky, supra note 393, at 1217.
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among the whole through taxes.396 It therefore seems that, in addition to an
endless sum of unanswered legal questions, Hurricane Katrina has left us
with a final question of morality as well. Should the cost of our
government's negligence be spread among all Americans, or should the
people living in the first and second poorest demographics in America
shoulder the entire burden?397
While different people will come to different conclusions, many states
have abolished sovereign immunity in support of "cost spreading,"'39 8 and
many judges and legal scholars have agreed with that principle.3 99 Before
396. See id.
397. ARLOC SHERMAN AND ISSAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ESSENTIAL
FACTS ABOUT THE VICTIMS OF HURRICAN KATRINA 1 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/9-19-05pov.htm.
In 2004, the national poverty rate was 13%, while Mississippi's poverty rate was 21.6% (worst),
Louisiana's poverty rate was 19.4% (2nd worst), and Alabama's poverty rate was 16.1% (8th worst).
Id. 2004 median household incomes were as follows: national average: $44,684; Mississippi:
$31,642 (2nd lowest); Louisiana: $35,110 (5th lowest); Alabama: $36,709 (9th lowest). See also
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the extreme poverty of New Orleans's Ninth Ward
neighborhood).
398. See, e.g., Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. 1973) ("We now hold
that the doctrine of governmental immunity-long since devoid of any valid justification-is
abolished in this Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania]. In so doing, we join the ever-increasing number
of jurisdictions which have judicially abandoned this antiquated doctrine.") (internal
citations omitted), superseded by statute, Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564; Klepinger v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 239 N.E.2d 160, 173 (Ind. 1968) ("It is further
our opinion that in determining the tort liability of a county or a city, our courts can now ignore the
governmental-proprietary distinction and render judgments and assess damages without regard to the
policy limits of any insurance carried by the city or county."), superseded by statute, Indiana Tort
Claims Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-13-3-1 to -25; Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618,
626-27 (Wis. 1962) ("[T]his court must face up to the responsibility of changing a court made rule of
law [municipal sovereign immunity], which we deem the interests of justice require be changed,
even though the legislature, by positive action short of codification has refused to make the
change."), superseded by statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 (West 1987).
399. See Chemerinsky, supra note 393, at 1217 ("Although abolishing sovereign immunity would
impose financial burdens on the government, it is better to spread the costs of injuries from illegal
government actions among the entire citizenry than to make the wronged individual bear the entire
loss."); Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 136 P.2d 480, 482 (N.M. 1943) ("It is almost incredible that in
this modem age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval
absolutism supposed to be implicit in the maxim, 'the King can do no wrong', should exempt the
various branches of the government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden of
damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed upon the single
individual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the entire community constituting
the government, where it could be borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly
belongs." (quoting Annotation, Rule of Municipal Immunity from Liability for Acts in Performance
of Governmental Functions as Applicable in Case of Personal Injury or Death as Result of a
Nuisance, 75 A.L.R. 1196, 1196 (1931))); Robert A. Leflar & Benjamin E. Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1954) (arguing that governmental immunity
can no longer be justified with "an amorphous mass of cumbrous language about sovereignty");
Ayala, 305 A.2d at 883-84 ("Equally unpersuasive is the argument ... that immunity is required
deciding the matter for themselves, taxpayers should realize that a tragedy of
Hurricane Katrina's magnitude can only be remedied by this country as a
whole. While most Americans are unconnected to the reasons why this
devastating event occurred, every taxpaying citizen has the opportunity to be
part of the reason why a tragedy like this never happens again.
B. Sending a Powerful Message
Although the unfathomable losses sustained by Hurricane Katrina
victims can never be fully restored, the judicial decision of whether or not to
hold the government liable for its Katrina-related negligence holds
significant implications for this country's future. The most significant
aspect of this decision will be its impact on future governmental
accountability. Governmental bodies at every level committed significant
errors and misjudgments which resulted in the unnecessary suffering of
countless Americans.4 °° If Katrina victims are given no recourse against
these agencies, which proved to be impotent in the face of danger, there will
be no incentive for the government to reevaluate and modify the existing
because governmental units lack funds from which claims could be paid. It is argued that funds
would be diverted to the payment of claims and the performance of proper governmental functions
would be obstructed. Initially, we note our disagreement with the assumption that the payment of
claims is not a proper governmental function. 'As many writers have pointed out, the fallacy in [the
no-fund theory] is that it assumes the very point which is sought to be proved i. e., that payment of
damage claims is not a proper purpose."' (quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302,
163 N.E.2d 89, 94 (IlI. 1959))); Id. ("Additionally, the empirical data does not support the fear that
governmental functions would be curtailed as a result of liability for tortious conduct .... The
availability of public insurance removes what was the underlying reason for [sovereign immunity]."
(citing Williams v. City of Detroit, Ill N.W.2d 1, 24 (Mich. 1961))); Id. at 884 ("Imposition of tort
liability will, thus, be more responsive to current concepts of justice. Claims will be treated as a
cost of administration and losses will be spread among all those benefited by governmental
action .... Moreover, 'where governmental immunity has had the effect of encouraging laxness and
a disregard of potential harm, exposure of the government to liability for its torts will have the effect
of increasing governmental care and concern for the welfare of those who might be injured by its
actions."' (quoting Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal,
52 MtNN. L. REv. 1047, 1057 (1968))); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
1004-05 (3d ed. 1964) ("Virtually all writers have agreed that no one of these reasons for denying
liability is sound, and all of them can be found to have been rejected at one time or another in the
decided cases. The current of criticism has been that it is better that the losses due to tortious
conduct should fall upon the municipality rather than the injured individual, and that the torts of
public employees are properly to be regarded, as in other cases of vicarious liability, as a cost of the
administration of government, which should be distributed by taxes to the public.") (footnotes
omitted); Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d, 860, 863 (N.Y. 1968) (Keating, J., dissenting) ("The fear
of financial disaster is a myth. The same argument was made a generation ago in opposition to
proposals that the State waive its defense of 'sovereign immunity'. The prophecy proved false then,
and it would now. The supposed astronomical financial burden does not and would not exist. No
municipality has gone bankrupt because it has had to respond [to its negligence] in damages ... [or
when] the State and its subdivisions have been held liable for the tortious conduct of their
employees.").
400. See supra Part II (discussing government preparation and response efforts).
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protocols that have proven to be ineffective. Furthermore, by allowing our
government to be sued for its negligence during Katrina, taxpayers will be
sending a powerful message. Americans will effectively put their
government on notice that incompetence of this magnitude will not stand,
and fundamental policy changes must immediately be made.
By requiring the federal government to pay damages, the current
administration will be forced to make the necessary modifications and
adjustments so that it will not be sued again when the next hurricane hits.
For example, the President will be forced to ensure that future DHS and
FEMA administrations are more competent and better experienced in the
field of disaster preparedness and response. 40 1 The next President who takes
office will be required to understand that he or she must act quickly and
decisively when federal agencies fail to act. Future cabinet-level Secretaries
will realize that their job security depends on their ability to effectively
coordinate among various levels of government and that squabbling on the
sidelines in the face of a national emergency is unacceptable.
Members of Congress facing reelection will have an opportunity to
show their constituents that they care deeply about the Americans affected
by this tragedy.402 By supporting the payment of Katrina judgments,
members of the House and Senate can show voters that the American
government addresses weakness within its ranks, and takes responsibility for
damage resulting from its mistakes. Young politicians should use this
opportunity to secure thousands of votes from Americans who are
disillusioned by the current administration's apparent lack of compassion
and concern for its citizens. Politicians in Gulf Coast regions can include
the need to compensate Katrina victims in their platforms, and secure votes
over incumbents who do not seem to share this concern.
Accountability and cost-spreading will force America to address the
mistakes that were made throughout the course of this tragedy. By allowing
damages to be paid to victims, judges can give the government the "shock
therapy" it so desperately needs. It is up to the American legal system to
insure that a tragedy like this never happens again, and the outcome of
Katrina litigation holds momentous implications for this country's future.
343
401. See supra Part ll.B. I (discussing incompetence of federal agencies during response efforts).
402. In 1928, Herbert Hoover used the Great Flood as a stepping-stone to the presidency. See
Mills, supra note 272. Hoover's platform was centered around his role in the government's response
to the Great Flood, and the public soon came to characterize him as a "'great humanitarian."' Id.
VI. CONCLUSION
All of the water has since dried up, but questions remain unanswered.
How could our government allow one of its greatest cities to be washed
away by a threat it has been predicting for decades? Why did federal, state,
and local governments remain paralyzed, when the need for action was so
apparent? Other than an occasional image on a television screen or a brief
reference in passing conversation, the people who were irreparably harmed
in Katrina's wake are slowly being forgotten. We can only hope that the
voices of the students who evacuated their beloved college campus on that
fateful day will continue to remind us of this tragedy which blindly claimed
so many lives.
The American judicial system remains as the last institution through
which we can heal the wounds our government has failed to mend. The
outcome of Katrina litigation will largely depend on judicial interpretations
of the duty our government owes to its people and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. For now, we must simply hope that courts will interpret the law
in ways that will allow these victims to be made whole again. The people of
New Orleans were devastated by Hurricane Katrina while their government
seemed to stand idly by. Now it is time for America to hear what they have
to say.
Tarak Anada*
*J.D. Candidate, 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law. This Comment is a tribute to those
who lost their lives and loved ones to Hurricane Katrina's wrath. It is first and foremost dedicated to
the poor, sick, and elderly Americans who were all but left behind during this senseless tragedy.
Your plight will not be forgotten, and we will not rest until our society learns the lessons brought by
this disaster. This Comment is also dedicated to my loving parents, whose constant support,
guidance, and sacrifice throughout the years are the sole reasons that I am here today. The author is
a graduate of Tulane University and plans to return to New Orleans, Louisiana upon graduation to
pursue a legal career.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: DEADLIEST DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
t
Year Event Number of Location/Areas Affected
Fatalities
1900 Galveston Hurricane 6,000-12,000 Texas
1906 San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 3,000-6,000 California
1928 Okeechobee Hurricane 3,500-4,078 Florida, Puerto Rico,
the Bahamas
2001 September 11, 2001 Attacks 2,992 New York, Washington
D.C., Pennsylvania
1889 Johnstown Flood 2,209 Pennsylvania
2005 Hurricane Katrina 1,836 Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama
1912 Titanic Shipwreck 1,490-1,522 Atlantic Ocean
1907 Monongah Coal Mine Disaster 362 West Virginia
1871 Great Chicago Fire 200-300 Illinois
1957 Hurricane Audrey 300 Louisiana, Texas
1969 Hurricane Camille 256 Mississippi, Alabama,
Virginia
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing 168 Oklahoma
2004 Hurricane Ivan 124 Texas, Florida
2005 Hurricane Rita 120 Florida, Gulf Coast
1994 Hurricane Betsy 81 Louisiana
1994 Northridge, Earthquake 57 California
1992 Hurricane Andrew 23 Louisiana, Florida
t This information was compiled through research conducted on Wikipedia.com. List of United
States Disasters by Death Toll, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Listof_United_ Statesdisasters_by-death-toll (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
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TABLE 2: PRIMARY GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS
Defendant Level of Negligent Actions Major Hurdles
Governmental
Involvement
DHS/FEMA Federal Failure to declare INS in Discretionary
time for adequate Function Exception
responses
The White House Federal Failure to provide Discretionary
assistance under Stafford Function Exception
Act
The Corps Federal Improper design and Flood Control Act
construction of levees and
canals
The State of Louisiana State Failure to declare Recovery of
mandatory evacuation in Damages
time, failure to enforce
mandatory evacuation
The City of New Local Failure to declare Recovery of
Orleans mandatory evacuation in Damages
time, failure to enforce
mandatory evacuation
Levee Districts, Local Failure to properly Recovery of
New Orleans Sewage maintain levees, removal Damages
and Water Board of pump station personnel
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